What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway)

Spencer, Joshua

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0029-y

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…However, there is good evidence that the ability condition on moral responsibility is not intuitively correct and that there are intuitive exceptions. Several philosophers have offered counterexamples demonstrating that it is sometimes intuitively correct to ascribe a moral responsibility to agents who lacks the ability to fulfill them (Graham 2011;Ryan 2003;Sinnott-Armstrong 1984;Spencer 2013). Perhaps the most well-known set of counterexamples against the condition from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) involve protagonists who limit their own ability to act in order to avoid fulfilling a promise:…”

Section: The Ability Condition On Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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According to one picture of the mind, decisions and actions are largely the result of automatic cognitive processing beyond our ability to control. This picture is in tension with a foundational principle in ethics that moral responsibility for behavior requires the ability to control it. The discovery of implicit attitudes contributes to this tension. According to the ability argument against moral responsibility, if we cannot control implicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes cause behavior, then we cannot be morally responsible for that behavior. The purpose of this paper is to refute the ability argument. Drawing on both scientific evidence in cognitive science and philosophical arguments in ethics and action theory, I argue that it is invalid and unsound because current evidence is insufficient to establish the premises that (1) implicit attitudes are uncontrollable, (2) that they significantly cause behavior, (3) that responsibility always requires ability, and (4) that even if uncontrollable attitudes did fully cause behavior, this entails that the behavior they cause is uncontrollable. The rejection of the ability argument questions the priority of the unconscious over the conscious mind in cognitive science, deprioritizes ability in theories of moral responsibility in ethics, and provides a strong reason to uphold moral responsibility for implicitly biased behavior.

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Section: The Ability Condition On Moral Responsibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Buckwalter¹

2018

Philos Stud

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“…Contemporary philosophers widely endorse various versions of OIC concerning what one is obliged, ought, or has duties to do when one is unable to do it [ 10 – 21 ]. The principle is also frequently invoked in debates in moral philosophy over the relationship between moral obligations and alternative possibilities [ 10 , 22 – 25 ], and the relationship between determinism and free will [ 26 – 28 ]. OIC is also often invoked in discussions about the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, such as classic “trolley problem” thought experiments [ 20 , 29 – 32 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Buckwalter

Turri

2015

PLoS ONE

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It is often thought that judgments about what we ought to do are limited by judgments about what we can do, or that “ought implies can.” We conducted eight experiments to test the link between a range of moral requirements and abilities in ordinary moral evaluations. Moral obligations were repeatedly attributed in tandem with inability, regardless of the type (Experiments 1–3), temporal duration (Experiment 5), or scope (Experiment 6) of inability. This pattern was consistently observed using a variety of moral vocabulary to probe moral judgments and was insensitive to different levels of seriousness for the consequences of inaction (Experiment 4). Judgments about moral obligation were no different for individuals who can or cannot perform physical actions, and these judgments differed from evaluations of a non-moral obligation (Experiment 7). Together these results demonstrate that commonsense morality rejects the “ought implies can” principle for moral requirements, and that judgments about moral obligation are made independently of considerations about ability. By contrast, judgments of blame were highly sensitive to considerations about ability (Experiment 8), which suggests that commonsense morality might accept a “blame implies can” principle.

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“…However an impressive case has been made in both philosophy and cognitive science that ought implies can is not intuitive. In philosophy, several researchers have offered thought experiments and argued that it is intuitively correct to ascribe moral obligations to agents who lack the ability to fulfill them (Graham 2011;King 2014;Mizrahi 2009;Ryan 2003;Spencer 2013). Similarly, in cognitive science, several independent teams of researchers have provided overwhelming scientific evidence that ought implies can is not an intuitive principle of moral psychology Turri 2014, 2015;Chituc et al 2016;Mizrahi 2015b, a;Turri 2017b, though for further discussion also see Cohen 2018;Kissinger-Knox et al 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

Buckwalter

2019

Philosophia

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A standard principle in ethics is that moral obligation entails ability, or that Bought implies can^. A strong case has been made that this principle is not well motivated in moral psychology. This paper presents an analogous case against the theoretical motivation for the principle. The principle is in tension with several foundational areas of ethical theorizing, including research on apologies, excuses, promises, moral dilemmas, moral language, disability, and moral agency. Across each of these areas, accepting the principle that obligation entails ability creates a theoretical problem that is more easily solved by rejecting it rather than accepting it. I conclude that the motivation for the principle is weak and that Bought implies can^should be rejected in ethics on theoretical grounds.

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What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway)

Cited by 12 publications

References 7 publications

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment

Theoretical Motivation of “Ought Implies Can”

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