Implicit attitudes and the ability argument

Abstract

According to one picture of the mind, decisions and actions are largely the result of automatic cognitive processing beyond our ability to control. This picture is in tension with a foundational principle in ethics that moral responsibility for behavior requires the ability to control it. The discovery of implicit attitudes contributes to this tension. According to the ability argument against moral responsibility, if we cannot control implicit attitudes, and implicit attitudes cause behavior, then we cannot be morally responsible for that behavior. The purpose of this paper is to refute the ability argument. Drawing on both scientific evidence in cognitive science and philosophical arguments in ethics and action theory, I argue that it is invalid and unsound because current evidence is insufficient to establish the premises that (1) implicit attitudes are uncontrollable, (2) that they significantly cause behavior, (3) that responsibility always requires ability, and (4) that even if uncontrollable attitudes did fully cause behavior, this entails that the behavior they cause is uncontrollable. The rejection of the ability argument questions the priority of the unconscious over the conscious mind in cognitive science, deprioritizes ability in theories of moral responsibility in ethics, and provides a strong reason to uphold moral responsibility for implicitly biased behavior.

Understanding Implicit Bias: Putting the Criticism into Perspective

“…). Prominent philosophers have questioned the validity of research on implicit social cognition altogether (e.g., Buckwalter ; Hermanson ,b, ; Machery , ,b; Yao and Reis‐Dennis n.d.). Edouard Machery (), for example, describes an ongoing ‘rescue mission’ within the field, implying that the relevant research is in peril of being discredited.…”

“…Recent meta-analytic reviews suggest that the Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a 'poor' predictor of behavior (Oswald et al 2013) and that changes in scores on implicit measures may not be associated with changes in behavior (Forscher et al 2019). Prominent philosophers have questioned the validity of research on implicit social cognition altogether (e.g., Buckwalter 2018;Hermanson 2017aHermanson ,b, 2018Machery 2016Machery , 2017aYao and Reis-Dennis n.d.). Edouard Machery (2017b), for example, describes an ongoing 'rescue mission' within the field, implying that the relevant research is in peril of being discredited.…”

The replication crisis and philosophy

“…An extensive meta-analysis appears to undermine previous claims that manipulating free will beliefs is associated with anti-social behavior, such as cheating (Genschow et al, 2022). The implicit association test, a keystone of philosophical theorizing across ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of mind faces a series of challenges regarding construct validity or usefulness (Buckwalter, 2019;Forscher et al, 2019;Machery, 2022). And the finding that intuitions about intentional action are influenced by implicit bias fails to replicate (Klein et al, 2018).…”

Implicit bias: a sin of omission?

“…1. The phenomenon I call 'implicit bias', following (Mandelbaum 2016;Brownstein and Saul 2016;Holroyd, Scaife, and Stafford 2017;Levy 2017), is also referred to in the literature as 'implicit attitude' (Brandenburg 2016;Buckwalter 2018;Levy 2014Levy , 2015 and 'implicit prejudice' (Baston and Vosgerau 2016;Lai, Hoffman, and Nosek 2013). I take my project to build on this body of literature.…”