What the Tortoise Said to Achilles

Carroll, Lewis

doi:10.4324/9780429495687-2

Cited by 124 publications

(38 citation statements)

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“…It must not be the case that these rules are always explicitly represented (meaning that they're the contents of some mental representation in the system). 7 As Lewis Carroll [1895] showed, that condition would generate a vicious regress.…”

Section: Bare Inferential Transitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Transitions

Quilty‐Dunn

Mandelbaum

2017

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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This paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions (BITs), transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls 'taking', that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit rich inferential transitions (RITs), which are transitions that the subject is disposed to endorse.

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Section: Bare Inferential Transitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Transitions

Quilty‐Dunn

Mandelbaum

2017

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…In , Lewis Carroll publishes ‘What the Tortoise Said to Achilles’. I have no evidence that Peirce had read that essay.…”

Section: The Problem Of An Infinite Regressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peirce on Truth as the Predestinate Opinion

Atkins

2017

European J of Philosophy

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In 1878's ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce states that truth is the predestinate opinion, or that which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate. Later in his life, though, he would claim both (i) that truth is what would be believed if we could figure out the right method of inquiry and (ii) that, instead of affirming that truth is the predestinate opinion in 1878, he ought to have affirmed that truth is what would be believed if inquiry were carried sufficiently far. The aim of this paper is to provide an account of why the early Peirce endorses the claim that truth is the predestinate opinion and why the late Peirce is compelled to modify that position. I argue that Peirce's early statement that truth is the predestinate opinion is motivated by his theory that all mental action is of the nature of a valid inference and that the later modification of his view is partly motivated by his rejection of that theory.

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“… See Carroll () for a, rightly, quite famous discussion. Harman () gives a powerful related presentation.…”

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confidence: 99%