Peirce holds that our logic should be the basis for our metaphysics. He also thinks that facts and propositions are structurally isomorphic. However, unlike many theorists who take propositions such as snow is white and grass is green as their paradigmatic examples, Peirce takes it rains (Latin: pleurit) and similar propositions as his paradigmatic examples. I explore how his analysis of such propositions and the way in which they convey meaning becomes more complex from 1895 to 1909, how this impacts his metaphysics, and how he can claim that something like the common environment of two interlocutors can itself be an index.
John Locke and Thomas Nagel dismiss the suggestion that seeing a scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet’s blare. Charles S. Peirce, however, argues that because there are no ideas that are unanalyzable and completely determinate, we should be able to develop an objective phenomenological vocabulary to describe the similarities and differences among diverse experiences. By developing a table of the most general classes into which elements of consciousness fall, Peirce aims to develop an objective phenomenological vocabulary. The key to developing such a vocabulary is a theory of formal logic. As Kant had proposed we base a table of the metaphysical categories on the logical forms of judgments, Peirce recommends we base a table of the phenomenological categories on the logical forms of propositions.
Kant bases a table of metaphysical categories on a table of the forms of judgments. Peirce regards Kant’s initial table of the forms of judgments as superficial and hasty. He criticizes it on four grounds. First, Kant has failed to recognize that by his own lights his table calls for a second set of categories. Second, Kant ought to have regarded his table as a table of propositions rather than of judgments. Third, Kant has failed to reduce the table to the fewest predicables possible. Fourth, Kant has peculiarly attempted to derive his set of metaphysical categories from a set of syncategorematic terms. Moreover, as Peirce develops a more mature classification of the sciences, he concludes that the categories ought to be found first in mathematics, a part of which is formal logic, and then traced through phenomenology, normative science (including logic as semiotics), and metaphysics.
No reasonable person would deny that the sound of a falling pin is less intense than the feeling of a hot poker pressed against the skin, or that the recollection of something seen decades earlier is less vivid than beholding it in the present. Yet John Locke is quick to dismiss a blind man’s report that the color scarlet is like the sound of a trumpet, and Thomas Nagel similarly avers that such loose intermodal analogies are of little use in developing an objective phenomenology. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), by striking contrast, maintains that the blind man is correct. Peirce’s reasoning stems from his phenomenology, which has received little attention as compared with his logic, pragmatism, or semiotics. Peirce argues that one can describe the similarities and differences between such experiences as seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet’s blare or hearing a falling pin and feeling a hot poker. Drawing on the Kantian idea that the analysis of consciousness should take as its guide formal logic, Peirce contends that we can construct a table of the elements of consciousness, much as Dmitri Mendeleev constructed a table of the chemical elements. By showing that the elements of consciousness fall into distinct classes, Peirce makes significant headway in developing the very sort of objective phenomenology which vindicates the studious blind man Locke derides.
The concept of truth is at the core of science, journalism, law, and many other pillars of modern society. Yet, given the imprecision of natural language, deciding what information should count as true is no easy task, even with access to the ground truth. How do people decide whether a given claim of fact qualifies as true or false? Across two studies (N = 1181; 16,248 observations), participants saw claims of fact alongside the ground truth about those claims. Participants classified each claim as true or false. Although participants knew precisely how accurate the claims were, participants classified claims as false more often when they judged the information source to be intending to deceive (versus inform) their audience, and classified claims as true more often when they judged the information source to be intending to provide an approximate (versus precise) account. These results suggest that, even if people have access to the same set of facts, they might disagree about the truth of claims if they attribute discrepant intentions to information sources. Such findings may shed light on the robust and persistent disagreements over claims of fact that have arisen in the “post-truth era”.
Recent public discourse in the U.S. has seen vigorous debate over the truth of claims of fact on important topics including climate change and vaccine safety. Would these and other disagreements about the truth evaporate if people believed the same set of facts? Across three studies (N = 2,061; 18,008 observations), participants were shown both true (Study 1) and false (Study 2, 3) claims of fact alongside the ground truth about those claims. We varied the intent of the information source across claims, either implicitly (Study 1) or explicitly (Study 2, 3), and participants were tasked with classifying whether they would consider each claim to be true or false in light of the ground truth. Although the claims themselves did not change and participants knew precisely how the claims differed from the ground truth, participants classified the claims as false more often when they deemed the information sources to have intentions to deceive their audience. Additionally, participants were more likely to classify a claim as true when they judged the information source to be trying to provide an approximate account, rather than a precise account. In sum, our findings suggest that people are sensitive to the intentions of information sources when classifying claims as true or false. Additionally, we argue that, in light of the Post-Truth Era’s eponymous disagreements over truth, our findings reveal an avenue through which such disagreements could arise, even when people believe the same set of facts.
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