What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU–U.S. Trade Negotiations

Abstract

The member states of the European Union (EU) have transferred their sovereignty over trade policymaking to the supranational level. When entering into trade negotiations with third countries, they must first reach a common bargaining position among themselves and later defend that position with a “single voice” at the international table. How do the institutional rules, through which the fifteen different voices are aggregated into a single one, affect international outcomes? Differentiating between a “conservative” and a “reformist” negotiating context, I argue that voting rules and negotiating competence in the EU determine both the probability that the negotiating parties conclude an international agreement and the substantive outcome of the negotiations. The recent EU–U.S. trade negotiations on agriculture, public procurement, and open skies are all evidence that, for a given distribution of preferences, internal EU institutional mechanisms affect the outcomes of international trade agreements.

The Incidental Fortress: The Single European Market and World Trade

“…The EU's common ag ri cul tur al policy (CAP) functions through a system of price supports, which re quires that agricultural imports be subject to very high tariffs to prevent them undercut-1 Among the handful of pieces that address the interaction between the internal dynamics of the SEM and its external impact are: Brewin (1997) on the impact of specifi c measures on specifi c third countries; Egan (2001, pp. 251-8) on standards; Hanson (1998) on quantitative restrictions; Meunier (2000) on ag ri cul ture, government procurement and air transport; Woolcock (1993) on technical barriers to trade (before the creation of the WTO); and Young (2002) on foreign direct investment and air transport.…”

The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

“…The presence of member states as a sole collective principal led to the development of 'three-level game' models, in which level I was the international arena, level II the EU arena, and level III the domestic arena (e.g., Collinson 1999;Meunier 2000;Patterson 1997). However, the extension of the consent procedure requires a re-adjustment of the levels; the formal steps of the consent procedure fit better into a 'two-level game' model.…”

“…In view of this new institutional setting, this article examines the role of EU institutions in international negotiations using principal -agent models and Putnam's 'two-level game' metaphor. Although these theoretical frameworks have been previously adapted to the EU's sui-generis system of governance in international negotiations, the role of the EP has been absent from such studies (Collinson 1999;Delreux 2008;Dür and Zimmermann 2007;Kerremans 2004;Larsén 2007a;Meunier 2000;Patterson 1997). This article proposes a model adjusted to the way the EU negotiates international agreements after the Treaty of Lisbon -focusing on the role of the EP and its relationship with both domestic (EU) and international actors.…”

EU Diplomacy at 27: United in Diversity?

“…In order to take into account the intricacies of playersʹ preferences and procedural frameworks, the literature evolved into spatial representation (Tsebelis, 1997;Garrett & Tsebelis, 1999;Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000;Hosli, 2000;Meunier, 2000;Tsebelis, 2002). One-dimension and two-dimensions spatial models have allowed the verification of certain assumptions, such as the importance of agenda setting.…”