The role of the European Parliament in international negotiations after Lisbon

Abstract

After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament (EP) can give or withdraw its consent to most international agreements. This new scenario calls for theoretical models that help us to better understand the roles and strategies of European Union (EU) institutions in international negotiations. Departing from 'two-level-games' and principal -agent models, this article examines three interrelated elements (levels of negotiations; decision-making stages; and strategies) to explain the first international negotiations under the consent procedure (SWIFT Agreement). This case shows how the EP made use of day-to-day decision-making to informally expand its formal veto powers. The EP is now capable of controlling the EU negotiator during both the agenda-setting and the negotiation stages. Its informal involvement is set to transform its relationship with the Council and their collective capacity to influence and control the Commission.

How do Lithuanian Citizens Perceive the European Parliament? EU Legitimacy Issue and Trust in the European Parliament

“…This showed the European Parliament's growing ambitions in international affairs and signalled a clear message to foreign countries that it is not enough to agree with the Member States alone (Rakutiene 2019). The agreement was approved only after both the US (hosting MEPs and the visit of US Vice-President Joe Biden to the European Parliament) and the EU Member States paid sufficient attention to the negotiations with the European Parliament and its proposed amendments on human rights and personal data protection (Servent 2014). According to Adriana Ripol Servent (2014), the European Parliament has thus given much greater prominence to its role, both in the consent procedure, as well as regarding its involvement in the negotiations with third countries and not only in the final stage of the agreement.…”

Of Principal(s') Interest? A Disaggregated, Multiple Principals' Approach to Commission Discretion

“…In terms of the breadth of EP interest, the opportunity-cost argument is even stronger given its inferior administrative capacity. In the past, it has focused on data protection (Ripoll Servent, 2014), intellectual property rights (Dür and Mateo, 2014) but also tried to influence the negotiations on vehicles with South Korea (Elsig and Dupont, 2012, p. 498). In the case of TTIP, it has bundled its resources and set up a 'special monitoring group' (Jančić, 2016, p. 900), which suggests a more widespread role.…”

Not Worth the Net Worth? The Democratic Dilemmas of Privileged Access to Information

“…While the Lisbon Treaty did not entail any significant changes for the EP's role in the area of CSFP, it had massive implications for the EP's role in deciding on EU international agreements (Ripoll Servent, 2014). The EP gained consent powers over "virtually any international agreement…of any significance" (Corbett, 2012, p. 249), and shall be fully informed at all stages of the negotiations (Article 218(10), TFEU).…”