What passive euthanasia is

Abstract

Background: Euthanasia can be thought of as being either active or passive; but the precise definition of "passive euthanasia" is not always clear. Though all passive euthanasia involves the withholding of life-sustaining treatment, there would appear to be some disagreement about whether all such withholding should be seen as passive euthanasia. Main text: At the core of the disagreement is the question of the importance of an intention to bring about death: must one intend to bring about the death of the patient in order for withholding treatment to count as passive euthanasia, as some sources would indicate, or does withholding in which death is merely foreseen belong to that category? We may expect that this unclarity would be important in medical practice, in law, and in policy. The idea that withholding lifesustaining treatment is passive euthanasia is traced to James Rachels's arguments, which lend themselves to the claim that passive euthanasia does not require intention to end life. Yet the argument here is that Rachels's arguments are flawed, and we have good reasons to think that intention is important in understanding the moral nature of actions. As such, we should reject any understanding of passive euthanasia that does not pay attention to intent. Short conclusion: James Rachels's work on active and passive euthanasia has been immensely influential; but this is an influence that we ought to resist.

Flaws in advance directives that request withdrawing assisted feeding in late-stage dementia may cause premature or prolonged dying

“…One could argue that the goal of this intervention is to determine if the loss of functioning is truly irreversible, and if not, the source of suffering. If so, then according to Brassington [ 62 ], “withdrawing life-sustaining treatment when death is not the intended outcome—and it may not be—is not euthanasia at all, passive or otherwise.” Limited Ability to Combine Conditions Causing Only Moderate Suffering = LACOMS (0) Opponents may dismiss directives as unacceptable if they list a condition that, by itself , causes only moderate suffering. Yet many planning principals still abhor such conditions—especially if they are simultaneously forced to endure a combination of such conditions.…”

How not to talk about passive euthanasia: A lesson from India

“…The upshot of this is that one should choose either Definition 3 or Definition 3#. For the record, I think that Definition 3 is preferable, and I spell out my reasoning elsewhere (1). But the argument that I shall propose over the coming pages does not depend on which definition for passive euthanasia we choose.…”

The mediated discourse and voice of euthanasia: the Israeli media as a case study

“…The complexity of euthanasia is not limited to its motivations and extends to a variety of procedural types included in the act itself. These range from the more active acts of euthanasia, such as the medical personnel either injecting a patient with a lethal drug or prescribing a lethal drug for the individual to self-inject, to the more passive acts of euthanasia, such as treatment withdrawal and the removal of a patient from life support (Brassington 2020, 3-5; Kiliclar et al 2017, 90–91; Moshe and Avital 2020, 2–3). This variation in types of procedures is value-laden and not merely a technical one.…”

“…This variation in types of procedures is value-laden and not merely a technical one. Indeed, the more active the procedure, the more it is frowned on by opponents (Brassington 2020, 11–12). Similarly, the ‘healthier’ the patient is subjectively perceived by society, the more opposition to their euthanasia.…”