What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?

Morton, Rebecca B.; Ou, Kai

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.009

Cited by 37 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…show that quantal response equilibrium can account for the higher than predicted turnout levels, but on its own cannot explain bandwagon, a behavior which is well documented in several experiments (see Morton and Ou, 2015). We propose a simple alternative theory assuming that voters obtain a small non-monetary utility if they vote and their party wins.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Instead, we do find the opposite effect in the large one-sided election. Following Morton and Ou (2015), we have called this phenomenon bandwagon effect. As they point out, several experimental studies find that participants are more likely to vote if they believe that their candidate is likely to win (Duffy and Tavits, 2008;Grosser and Schram, 2010;Kartal, 2014;Agranov, Goeree, Romero, and Yariv, 2012).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, we find that, in the large one-sided election, the majority's turnout rate is higher than the minority's. Following Morton and Ou (2015), we refer to this as bandwagon effect. 7 As noted by Morton and Ou, this is a common finding in laboratory experiments on voting behavior (Duffy and Tavits, 2008;Grosser and Schram, 2010;Kartal, 2014;Agranov, Goeree, Romero, and Yariv, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 The probability of randomly answering correctly all 5 questions at the first attempt is 1.7 × 10 −5 . 7 Morton and Ou (2015) call this phenomenon bandwagon abstention effect, as opposed to bandwagon vote choice, which refers to a situation in which "the knowledge that one candidate is more likely to win leads supporters of the loser to switch their support for the winner" (Morton and Ou, 2015, 226). As in our experiment a subject is not allowed to vote for the other group, bandwagon vote choices cannot occur.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment

2019

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We test the turnout predictions of the standard two-party, private value, costly voting model through a large-scale, real effort experiment. We do this by recruiting 1,200 participants through Amazon's Mechanical Turk and employing a 2 x 2 between subjects design encompassing small (N = 30) and large (N = 300) elections, as well as close and one-sided elections. We find partial evidence of selfish instrumental voting. Participants with a higher opportunity cost are less likely to vote (cost effect); turnout rate decreases as the electorate size increases (size effect) in one-sided elections and increases the closer the election is (competition effect) in large elections. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, in large one-sided elections the majority turns out to vote at a higher rate than the minority. We propose an alternative theory assuming that voters obtain a small non-monetary utility if they vote and their party wins.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment

2019

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“…A plausible explanation is the relationship between the electoral frame and the phenomenon of the Incumbency advantage (Freier, 2015;Redmond and Regan, 2015). Previous studies have provided evidence that people have a tendency to vote for the winner or want to be associated with the winner of the elections (Morton and Ou, 2015;. In the Framing treatment, being being part of the minority party may make subjects less likely to vote, since the probability of being associated with the winner is lower.…”

Section: Framing Treatmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral fraud and voter turnout: An experimental study

Baghdasaryan

Iannantuoni

2019

European Journal of Political Economy

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In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables us to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

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Polls, Pundits and Religious Leaders: The Politics of Predicting Election Outcomes in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

Alidu

2024

Political Institutions, Party Politics and Communication in Ghana

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What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?

Cited by 37 publications

References 55 publications

Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment

Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment

Electoral fraud and voter turnout: An experimental study

Polls, Pundits and Religious Leaders: The Politics of Predicting Election Outcomes in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

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