What Kind of Noise Guarantees Security for the Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise Key Exchange?

Mingesz, Róbert; Vadai, Gergely; Gingl, Zoltán

doi:10.1142/s0219477514500217

Cited by 29 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [5] and the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26] secure key exchange are two examples of hardware-based secure key exchange concepts that are information theoretically secure [27]. Thus even with infinite computing resources the key will not be extracted by Eve, because the security offered by these schemes are based on fundamental laws of physics, to crack the key exchange would require Eve to break the underpinning laws of physics.…”

Section: Hardware-based Secure Key Exchangesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Requirements and Speed versus Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges

Gonzalez

Balog

Kish

2015

Entropy

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The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of sophistication of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are theoretically information-secure are quantum key distribution (QKD) and Kirchoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN). However, these concepts require a dedicated connection between hosts in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be impractical and or cost prohibitive. A practical and cost effective method is to have each host share their respective cable(s) with other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize a secure key exchange without the need of an additional cable or key exchanger. In this article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and time required in the star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network and compare it with other network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and equation for the number of secure bit exchange periods needed in a star network. We then outline other network geometries and trade-off possibilities that seem interesting to explore.

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Section: Hardware-based Secure Key Exchangesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Requirements and Speed versus Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges

Gonzalez

Balog

Kish

2015

Entropy

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“…The answer to the questions is simple, and we first observe that the voltage Ux(t) will be a Gaussian noise [8][9][10], because a linear combination of Gaussians results in a Gaussian as a consequence of the Central Limit Theorem [11]. Thus the real question regards the variance of the voltage.…”

Section: Case 1: Lossless Short Cable With Very Small Impedancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the security proofs in earlier work [9,10], it is a strict mathematical requirement for the security of the KLJN scheme to have Gaussian processes, which means that the time derivatives also must be Gaussians. GAA did not specify their waveform generator, and thus the degree of Gaussianity remains unclear.…”

Section: Non-gaussianitymentioning

confidence: 99%

On the “Cracking” Scheme in the Paper “A Directional Coupler Attack Against the Kish Key Distribution System” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott

Chen¹,

Kish²,

Granqvist³

et al. 2014

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA's mathematical model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA's cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack [Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374:2140-2142 (2010)], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy cable. We also investigate GAA's claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing-using statistics over a few correlation times only-the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less than 10 -8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA's assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the timederivative nature of GAA's scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts.

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“…The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution scheme [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] is a classical-statistical physical alternative to the quantum key distribution. Figure 1 depicts a binary version of the KLJN scheme and shows that, during a single-bit exchange, the communicating parties (Alice and Bob) connect their randomly chosen resistor (including its Johnson noise generator) to a wire channel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To avoid a potential information leak by variations in the shape of a probability distribution, the noises are Gaussian [1], and it has been proven that other distributions cannot offer perfect security [17,18]. The security against active (invasive) attacks is provided by the robustness of classical-physical quantities, which guarantees that they can be continuously monitored and exchanged between Alice and Bob via authenticated communication.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (RRRT-KLJN) Key Exchange

Kish¹,

Granqvist²

2016

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.

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What Kind of Noise Guarantees Security for the Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise Key Exchange?

Cited by 29 publications

References 17 publications

Resource Requirements and Speed versus Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges

Resource Requirements and Speed versus Geometry of Unconditionally Secure Physical Key Exchanges

On the “Cracking” Scheme in the Paper “A Directional Coupler Attack Against the Kish Key Distribution System” by Gunn, Allison and Abbott

Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (RRRT-KLJN) Key Exchange

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