1974
DOI: 10.2307/2183914
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What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

Abstract: Our reading is Nagel's 1974 article "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," which examines the reductionist theory that some contemporary philosophers propose as a solution to "the mindbody problem"-the problem of how the mind and body are related. Reductionism is the view that one kind of thing can be "reduced to" (explained fully in terms of) another kind of thing. With respect to the mind-body problem, reductionism holds that the mind and mental phenomena can be reduced to physical phenomena, such as neurological a… Show more

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Cited by 5,178 publications
(1,710 citation statements)
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“…The, so-called, hard problem is an offspring of this dualist tradition. Indeed, today, it is common in the study of consciousness to pay tribute to the division between the Hard Problem and the Easy Problems (HPEP) [6] or the, socalled, explanatory gap [7]: how can we explain the 'raw feel' of the experience of being like something such as Thomas Nagel or his notorious bat [8]? However, behind this profoundness hides a simple syllogism: Science advances third person descriptions of natural phenomena; Conscious experience is first person, therefore, Consciousness cannot be described by science.…”
Section: Introduction 'That Is Very Hokey!'mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The, so-called, hard problem is an offspring of this dualist tradition. Indeed, today, it is common in the study of consciousness to pay tribute to the division between the Hard Problem and the Easy Problems (HPEP) [6] or the, socalled, explanatory gap [7]: how can we explain the 'raw feel' of the experience of being like something such as Thomas Nagel or his notorious bat [8]? However, behind this profoundness hides a simple syllogism: Science advances third person descriptions of natural phenomena; Conscious experience is first person, therefore, Consciousness cannot be described by science.…”
Section: Introduction 'That Is Very Hokey!'mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Additionally, Kant (1781Kant ( /1997 suggested that 'simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori', thereby laying theoretical grounds for the existence of internal operations underlying the temporal structuring of perception. The operational and internal constraints that shape perception are crucial for one's conscious appreciation of the world: suffice to consider the seminal thought experiment on what being a bat is like ( Nagel 1974). From an evolutionary standpoint, the temporal constraints that primates are endowed with may be very different from, say, those of a snail for which Mozart sonata would have to be played so slow that it would lose any perceptual coherence for the human ear (Brecher 1932;Blumenthal 1977).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even though sentience is not a perfectly precise concept [38], and even though we lack the means for truly assessing qualia (subjective experiences) of life forms other than humans [39], it is almost certain that we humans are not the only life form capable of experiencing pain and pain-related su ering and that many animals on our planet are sentient as well [40]. Sentient extraterrestrial life forms require a di erent moral stance than non-sentient life forms.…”
Section: Non-primitive Sentient Lifementioning
confidence: 99%