In recent years, several instances of political actors who created fake grassroots activity on the Internet have been uncovered. We propose to call such fake online grassroots activity digital astroturfing, and we define it as a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by political actors that mimics bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals. The goal of this paper is to lay out a conceptual map of the phenomenon of digital astroturfing in politics. To that end, we introduce, first, a typology of digital astroturfing according to three dimensions (target, actor type, goals), and, second, the concept of digital astroturfing repertoires, the possible combinations of tools, venues and actions used in digital astroturfing efforts. Furthermore, we explore possible restrictive and incentivizing countermeasures against digital astroturfing. Finally, we discuss prospects for future research: Even though empirical research on digital astroturfing is difficult, it is neither impossible nor futile.

Almost since the advent of the Internet, there has been great interest in analyzing and understanding online communication from the perspective of public sphere theory. The question of whether the properties of the Internet and, specifically, social media actually contribute to the public sphere is the matter of ongoing and somewhat heated scientific debate. The aim of the article is twofold. First, we propose a hierarchical model of generalized functions of public sphere. On a theoretical level, we interweave different strands of thought on the public sphere, and the resulting model is more inclusive and less rigid than each of those strands on their own. We identify four generalized functions: identity building, agenda-setting, control and criticism, and deliberation. The Internet does not contribute equally to these functions and we evaluate the impact of the Internet on each of these functions as a diminishing marginal utility. Second, we empirically explore the plausibility of our model in a global comparative analysis with focus on the Internet. With the help of macro-level variables which indicate the structural preconditions for a public sphere, we identify the highest possible function of the public sphere for each country to which the Internet can potentially contribute. Based on this approach, future research can be contextualized: case-studybased research can plausibly articulate expectations regarding the impact of the Internet on the public sphere.

In recent years, several instances of political actors who created fake grassroots activity on the Internet have been uncovered. We propose to call such fake online grassroots activity digital astroturfing, and we define it as a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by political actors that mimics bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals. The goal of this paper is to lay out a conceptual map of the phenomenon of digital astroturfing in politics. To that end, we introduce, first, a typology of digital astroturfing according to three dimensions (target, actor type, goals), and, second, the concept of digital astroturfing repertoires, the possible combinations of tools, venues and actions used in digital astroturfing efforts. Furthermore, we explore possible restrictive and incentivizing countermeasures against digital astroturfing. Finally, we discuss prospects for future research: Even though empirical research on digital astroturfing is difficult, it is neither impossible nor futile.

Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude, potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for uncertainty.

In this study, we analyze whether the mere volume of presence in mass media and the mere volume of activity on social media convey advantages to candidates in parliamentary elections. Based on the theoretical model of bounded rationality, we call these potential effects brute force effects. During the last month of the election campaign of the Swiss federal election of 2015, we have tracked the presence of all 873 candidates in the canton of Zurich, the most populous canton, in a broad sample of mass media. Additionally, we have tracked those candidates' activity on Facebook and Twitter. The results of our multilevel Bayesian estimates show that mass media presence has a consistent non-trivial impact on different aspects of electoral outcome. Furthermore, social media activity also has a non-trivial impact, but only in terms of resonance (reactions to candidates' social media activity). Overall, our results suggest that brute force effects of of mass media presence and social media activity can have substantial impact on voting behavior.

The accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011 greatly affected attitudes toward nuclear energy in many countries, including Switzerland. In this study, we analyzed the evolution of public opinion about nuclear energy in Switzerland from 2012 to 2014 to determine how different dimensions of attitudes toward nuclear energy changed in the years following the accident and which factors influenced general opinion about nuclear energy. The primary findings show that public opinion about nuclear energy became only slightly more positive as time passed and that the most important predictor of the general opinion about nuclear energy was the individual assessment of its benefits and risk.

In this study, we analyze whether there are differences in attitudes towards nonprofit organizations (NPOs) between the generational cohorts of Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. We do so by analyzing survey data from Switzerland in two steps, a Bayesian estimation as well as a cluster analysis. The overall results suggest that there are, at best, only few and small intergenerational differences: The only consistent effect we find are the more negative attitudes of the Baby Boomer cohort towards professional associations and towards sports NPOs, but those differences could be due to life cycle rather than intergenerational effects. Overall, our results suggest that the Millennial generational cohort is at least as interested in and willing to engage with NPOs as previous generational cohorts. *

The gambler's fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy can arise: The irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler's fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler's fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler's fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.