What is Epistemic Blame?

Brown, Jessica

doi:10.1111/nous.12270

Cited by 49 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…4. 5 Jessica Brown has argued that Sher's account extends naturally to the epistemic domain(Brown 2020; see Boult MS for a response to Brown's argument). In my view, even the manifestation of frustrated desires that people not have acted (or, believed) badly seem somewhat out of place in the epistemic domain.…”

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confidence: 99%

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Boult

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame. My account draws on a prominent line of theorizing in moral philosophy that ties blame to our relationships with one another. I argue that with my account of epistemic blame on hand, the most compelling worries about epistemic blame can be deflated. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. the relationship-based account of epistemic blame on hand, none of them has much force. There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. 2 2. The Problem of Cool Judgment Recently, R.J. Wallace (2013) has argued that the sting, force, and depth of blame are to be explained in terms of the idea that blame is essentially a kind of negative emotional response. Blame essentially involves negative reactive attitudes such as indignation, resentment, and guilt (in the case of self-blame). Wallace is not alone in this view. Indeed, he is a prominent voice among a large number of moral philosophers who take a broadly 'Strawsonian' approach to blame (Strawson 1962; Wolf 2013; Menges 2017). Why take such an approach? Consider the familiar distinction between judging that something is valuable, and actually valuing it. Wallace proposes we model the distinction between judging blameworthy and blaming on this distinction. The difference between judging X valuable and actually valuing X comes down to a difference in one's engagement with X. When one values X, one is engaged and exercised by X. One gets excited by opportunities to X, disappointed by missing opportunities to X. Meanwhile, in judging X valuable, one merely recognizes that there are reasons for someone to be so exercised, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. According to Wallace, something similar is true of blame. When one blames someone for doing something, one is engaged and exercised by what they have done. It matters to one that this person has done something bad, or flouted some norm, and by blaming them for it one manifests this concern in an engaged way. Meanwhile, in judging someone blameworthy, one merely judges that there are reasons for one (or someone else) to be so engaged, without yet necessarily being that way oneself. The key point, according to Wallace, is that the emotions are an integral part of what it is for human beings to be 'engaged' and 'exercised' in this way. Imagine someone claiming to value opera without feeling any emotion whatsoever about the prospect of going to the Met. Other things being equal, it would be natural to conclude that they do not actually value opera (even though they might judge it valuable)....

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confidence: 99%

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Boult

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…5 Bell (2013), Strawson (1962), Wallace (1994) and Wolf (2011). 6 See Section #5 and Brown (2017) and Brown (2018). 7 For arguments against the most popular conativisms on the market, see Section #5 and e.g.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cognitivism about emotions bracketed, of course.21 SeeBrown (2018),Boult (2020), and Piovarchy (2020) for recent work on epistemic blame.…”

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confidence: 99%

Blame as performance

Simion

2021

Synthese

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This paper develops a novel account of the nature of blame: on this account, blame is a species of performance with a constitutive aim. The argument for the claim that blame is an action is speech-act theoretic: it relies on the nature of performatives and the parallelism between mental and spoken blame. I argue that the view scores well on prior plausibility and theoretical fruitfulness, in that: it rests on claims that are widely accepted across sub-disciplines, it explains the normativity of blaming and it accounts for associated psychological phenomena.

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“…The most recent account of the nature of epistemic blame seems wellpositioned to do just this. Drawing on George Sher's influential work on moral blame (2006), Jessica Brown (2020) has developed an account of epistemic blame in terms of a characteristic set of dispositions unified by a certain belief-desire pair. Brown argues that the account has a number of attractive features, including the ability to explain private epistemic blame, and to capture the wide variety of manifestations that epistemic blame can take.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The significance of epistemic blame

Boult

2021

Erkenn

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One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame-due to Jessica Brown-is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in an instructive way. Drawing on the lessons learned, I put forward an alternative approach to the nature of epistemic blame. My account understands epistemic blame in terms of modifications to the intentions and expectations that comprise our "epistemic relationships" with one another. This approach has a number of attractions shared by Brown's account, but it can also explain the significance of epistemic blame.

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What is Epistemic Blame?

Cited by 49 publications

References 33 publications

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame

Blame as performance

The significance of epistemic blame

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