The significance of epistemic blame

Boult, Cameron

doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00382-0

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…Failing to distinguish between different kinds of reactive attitudes that presuppose different kinds of capacities is the main reason why we get puzzled about how we can be responsible not only for our actions, but also for our attitudes (Schmidt, 2020). See Boult (2020Boult ( , 2021a, Brown (2018), and Kauppinen (2018) on the nature of distinctive epistemic blame or criticism. See Boult (2021b) for a recent overview of the literature on epistemic blame.…”

Section: Practical Reasons For Belief As State-reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Schmidt

2021

Philos Stud

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It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states (new pragmatism); or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons (traditional pragmatism). I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go.

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Section: Practical Reasons For Belief As State-reasonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Schmidt

2021

Philos Stud

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“…Similarly, Boult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021b uses the example of trust to show that epistemic relationship modification can be presented in the Scanlonian framework; paradigmatically, we epistemically blame another in response to their epistemic failing by intending to trust them less (or on a smaller range of issues) and we expect them to be less reliable sources of information.…”

Section: Three Accounts Of Epistemic Blamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This view has primarily been defended byBoult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021b). It's also accepted inSchmidt (2021Schmidt ( , 2022 and discussed in Greco (forthcoming).…”

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confidence: 99%

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Smartt

2023

Philos Stud

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I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame. Epistemologists often find it useful to draw a distinction between blameless and blameworthy norm violation. In recent years, this has led several writers to develop theories of ‘epistemic blame.’ I present two challenges against the very idea of epistemic blame. First, everything that is supposedly done by epistemic blame is done by epistemic evaluation, at least according to a prominent view about the social role of epistemic evaluation. Parsimony considerations count against introducing an idle mechanism that does the same work as an existing one. Second, no current theory of epistemic blame includes a plausible account of the force of epistemic blame or the practices that could express it. I conclude that we should give up the notion of epistemic blame.

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“…The thought is that, in order to count as "criticism", the form of response at issue must somehow go beyond mere assessment vis-à-vis a standard. For instance, blaming someone is sometimes 17 Brown (2020), Boult (2020Boult ( , 2021aBoult ( , 2021bBoult ( , 2021c, Schmidt (2021).…”

Section: An Argument Against Minimalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our desires aren't frustrated when individuals fail to believe pointless and silly disjunctive claims. 26 Third, there's Boult's own relationship-based view of epistemic blame (Boult 2020(Boult , 2021c. According to Boult's view, epistemic blame consists in a kind of relationshipmodification.…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Evidential Minimalism

Buckley

2022

Episteme

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Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. What accounts for the normativity of evidence? According to the view that I'll call “evidential minimalism”, there is a close connection between strong evidence for the truth of p and a normative reason to believe p: evidence is either itself a normative reason for belief, or evidence gives rise to such a reason when certain other minimal conditions are met. In this paper, I argue against evidential minimalism. I will argue that there are cases where: (i) an individual S possesses strong evidence E for the truth of p at time t, (ii) all other minimal conditions for the normativity of E are met at t, (iii) S doesn't believe p at t, yet (iv) S isn't open to any form of criticism on account of (i)–(iii) at t. I will then formulate a plausible linking claim connecting openness to criticism and the existence of normative reasons for belief. The minimalist can either accept or reject this linking claim. I will argue that, either way, the minimalist view falters.

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The significance of epistemic blame

Cited by 16 publications

References 22 publications

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

Scepticism about epistemic blame

Against Evidential Minimalism

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