What is at stake in the information sphere? Anxieties about malign information influence among ordinary Swedes

Abstract

Scholars, states and organisations have warned that authoritarian regimes and other hostile actors are projecting information to inflict harm upon others. Yet, there is little agreement on the nature of this threat. This is mirrored in the plethora of labels in use, ranging from "disinformation" to "sharp power" and "information warfare". In order to investigate this menace further, we turn our focus to ordinary people's anxieties, since a better understanding of threat perceptions will also provide a better understanding of the problem. We conducted a comprehensive case study comprising focus group discussions (n: 97) and an extensive survey (n: 2046) among Swedish citizens. We asked: To what extent do people worry about information influence and why? What can this tell us about the nature of this problem or threat? The empirical results suggest that respondents were first and foremost worried about societal cohesion and democracy. They also identified a risk that information influence can undermine trust in societal institutions and the EU. Based on our findings, we suggest that "malign information influence" is an appropriate label to be used in future research. Finally, we propose directions for future systematic research on how malign information infuence is received and processed in different national contexts.

Weaponizing narrative: Russia contesting EUrope’s liberal identity, power and hegemony

“…The phenomenon of narrative weaponization as conceptualized here, is recent, which explains a dearth of scholarly work on it, especially as regards its effects, or implications. Even though this domain presents a generally challenging area of enquiry, some accounts are currently succeeding in showcasing such effects within specific countries or territories, including as regards turning Ukraine from Russia's 'brother' into 'other' (Khaldarova 2019), the cultivation of the discourse of fear in the Baltics (Ventsel et al 2019), instigation of social anxiety in Sweden (Wagnsson 2020), or demonization of the enmity across the US-American audience as a result of Russian narrative offensive via statesponsored media (Fisher 2020).…”

“…The wider international effects of Russian narrative weaponization are too diverse, dispersed and dormant to be assessed here in their entirety. The burgeoning literature on the matter, however, helps grasp the nature and scope of effects that Russian weaponized narrative triggers in select countries or areas, as discussed above (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2018;Horbyk 2017;Ventsel et al 2019;Wagnsson 2020;Fisher 2020). Crucially, it also takes time for some effects to materialize andimportantly -to become recognized.…”

Speaking of hybrid warfare: Multiple narratives and differing expertise in the ‘hybrid warfare’ debate in Czechia

“…The EU then also piloted the move towards information dimension, especially in focusing on strategic communication, debunking disinformation or working with digital platforms (Ördén, 2019). Therefore, what started as a military concept to describe a type of armed conflict became entangled with issues related to democratic institutions, social media platforms or changes in media consumption (Monsees, 2020; Wagnsson, 2020).…”

“…In contrast, arguments exploring western countermeasures and understandings of HW have been less frequent. Some have focused on the composition of actors involved and highlighted the contingencies of construction of HW as a security and political issue (Daniel and Eberle, 2018; Monsees, 2020; Ördén, 2019; Szostek, 2020), while others explored systemic responses to disinformation (Bjola and Papadakis, 2020; Wagnsson, 2020). A growing number of studies also dig into the political dimension of HW discourse and its entanglement with identity (re)construction of international organisations or particular countries (Baumann, 2020; Eberle and Daniel, 2019; Mälksoo, 2018).…”

“…By corruption and manipulation of the Czech public and formal and informal alliances with like-minded local actors, Russia threatens the very foundations of the Czech democracy, self-determination and liberal western identity. In this vein, the narrative warns that HW, and especially disinformation campaigns as its indivisible part, threaten to also destroy the Czech public sphere and flood the population with multiple competing truth-claims (for such debate in other countries, see Bjola and Papadakis, 2020; Monsees, 2020; Wagnsson, 2020). Thus, HW seeks to ‘systematically undermine trust in authorities, relativize values and strengthen extreme opinions’ (Táborský, 2019: 92).…”