2021
DOI: 10.1080/14782804.2021.1883561
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Weaponizing narrative: Russia contesting EUrope’s liberal identity, power and hegemony

Abstract: Europe has always occupied a special place in Russia's storytelling of the 'self' and the 'other'-from Russia being portrayed as 'part of Europe' to it being cast as a 'better Europe' or an alternative to Europe that stands for conservative values or a different model of regional cooperation, including such as the Eurasian Economic Union. This article explores the recent shift from discursive contestation to subversion-all around the conflict in Ukraine and in a broader framework of a Russian matryoshka-style … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
5
2

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 16 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 56 publications
(38 reference statements)
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The Russian Federation “attaches great importance to the dissemination of a strategic narrative supportive of Russian foreign policy and its appeal stems from its ability to blend with already existing, frequently socially conservative, nationalistic and anti-Wester discourse among target audiences abroad” ( Nilsson, 2021, p. 63 ). Tyushka (2022) has shown how the narratives “became weaponized as part of Russia’s matryoshka-style multi-layered conflict in the simultaneous fight against Ukraine’s sovereignty, European normative power and enlargement as well as a lasting (geo)political standoff with the ‘West’ following the loss of the Cold War” (p. 17). Similarly, the Russian Federation employs historical-based cleavages and political divisions in foreign countries to favour far-right political parties in those countries, and narratives justifying their domestic and expansionist foreign policy based on fabricated parallelisms with what the Kremlin alleges to be happening in the West.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Russian Federation “attaches great importance to the dissemination of a strategic narrative supportive of Russian foreign policy and its appeal stems from its ability to blend with already existing, frequently socially conservative, nationalistic and anti-Wester discourse among target audiences abroad” ( Nilsson, 2021, p. 63 ). Tyushka (2022) has shown how the narratives “became weaponized as part of Russia’s matryoshka-style multi-layered conflict in the simultaneous fight against Ukraine’s sovereignty, European normative power and enlargement as well as a lasting (geo)political standoff with the ‘West’ following the loss of the Cold War” (p. 17). Similarly, the Russian Federation employs historical-based cleavages and political divisions in foreign countries to favour far-right political parties in those countries, and narratives justifying their domestic and expansionist foreign policy based on fabricated parallelisms with what the Kremlin alleges to be happening in the West.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This ties into Russia’s portrayal of Europe as a decadent, deviant space where norms have degenerated (Tyushka, 2021) and, within this, how the Netherlands has long been afforded a leading role in Russia’s construction of European liberalism. For example, Edenborg (2018) discusses Russian media’s coding of Dutch society in 2013, where a reporter mentioning ‘Dutch tolerance’ was underlaid by more nefarious intentions by implicitly associating the Dutch normalization of LGBTQ issues to paedophilia.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Strategic narratives can be intended for and received by different audiences. In this case, narratives projected by a foreign language, internationally-orientated outlet such as RT can be considered as targeting foreign audiences – although similar narrative content of European failure is also commonly received by the Russian domestic audience in national news outlets (Tyushka, 2021). Given the rise in the discourse around the potential security threats conferred by Russian malign information influence on Dutch society, especially with recent investigations detecting churnalized content in Dutch social media spaces (AIVD, 2021; Government of the Netherlands, 2020a), one of the most pertinent foreign audiences to explore here would be the Dutch domestic audience.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%