What Happened to the “Social” in Social Psychology?*

Abstract

This article describes the historical abandonment of the distinctive conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior embraced by American social psychologists in the early decades of the twentieth century. It is suggested that part of the reason why the original conception of the social was abandoned by American psychologists was because of its association with theories of the "group mind," the apparent threat it posed to cherished principles of rationality and autonomy, and the impoverished conception of the social inherited from European crowd theorists that came to inform the experimental study of social groups. It is suggested that while these factors partly explain the neglect of the social in American social psychology, none represent particularly good reasons for abandoning the original conception of the social. Consequently there are in principle no impediments to the revival of the theoretical and experimental study of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior in contemporary American social psychology.In this paper I address and suggest tentative answers to a puzzling historical question: why was the original conception of social psychological phenomena embraced by early American social psychologists progressively neglected and eventually abandoned as the twentieth century developed? In this short paper I don't expect to be able to persuade many of the virtues of the original conception, or of my historical explanation of its neglect. However, I do hope to encourage some to reflect critically on the peculiar history of social psychology, and to reconsider the justification for contemporary conceptions of the social psychological. THE LOST WORLDIn the early decades of the twentieth century, American social psychologists (in both departments of psychology and sociology) held a distinctive conception of the social dimensions of cognition, emotion and behavior. Social cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as forms of cognition, emotion and behavior engaged because and on condition that other members of social groups are represented as engaging these (or other) forms of cognition, emotion and behavior in similar circumstances ( Bogardus). Social cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as psychological states and behavior engaged socially : that is, by reference to the represented psychology and behavior of members of social groups. In contrast, individual cognition, emotion and behavior were conceived as cognition, emotion and behavior engaged individually : that is, for reasons or causes independent of the represented psychology and behavior of members of social groups.These distinctions may be illustrated by reference to a concrete example drawn from early American social psychology. Roger Schanck (1932) studied the preferences for forms of baptism among Methodists and Baptists. Among the Methodists,

From Utopia to Dystopia: Levels of explanation and the politics of social psychology

“…To respond to this question, I suggest to move further back in time and consider the precursors of these perspectives. The historian of science John Greenwood (2004) argued in a paper with an evocative title ("What happened to the 'social' in social psychology?") that pre-allportian social psychology was authentically "social": "Behaviour was held to be socially engaged if it is oriented to the represented behaviour of members of social groups in similar circumstances.…”

“…Allport's fondness for opinion polls illustrates this perspective fittingly. As noted by Greenwood (2004), this approach represents a radical shift from the more sociological perspectives that were then popular. For example, Faris (1925, p. 405, cited by Greenwood, 2004 argued that "social" or "group" attitudes refer to "collective phenomena that are not mere summations".…”

“…Hasn't social psychology changed radically after World War II? If anything, the Allportian perspective has grown in influence (Farr, 1996;Greenwood, 2004). In 1952, for example, Solomon Asch maintains the Allports' credo in the introduction to his influential overview of the discipline: "(…) social facts have their locus largely in individuals; the psychological study of social facts is the study of individuals in society" (Asch, 1952, p. IX).…”

“…The Allportian view leaves no place to "systemic" or "dynamic" conceptions of collective behaviour that transcend the individual level. It forms the matrix of experimental social psychology and is still pervasive today, particularly in social cognition (Greenwood, 2004) although few social psychologists are aware of the role played by Floyd Allport in this evolution.…”

“…Shall we explain stereotyping of Africans among Western Europeans by biased cognitive processes or by the relative positions of these two groups in European societies? Although debates surrounding levels of explanation in social psychology have always been abundant, the individual level has gained the upper hand especially in the experimental variant of the discipline (Farr, 1996;Greenwood, 2004;Moscovici & Marková, 2006). This trend can be traced back to Floyd Allport, the author of the first social psychology textbook (Allport, 1924).…”