What Goes Without Saying: Husserl’s Concept of Style

Meacham, Darian

doi:10.1163/15691640-12341241

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…We have in mind what both Husserl (1912Husserl ( /1989 and Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962 identify as an individual's bodily-affective style: their overall characteristic manner of comportment, including distinctive ways of speaking, gesturing, moving, etc. (Meacham, 2013). Important for our purposes is the fact that one's style is not fixed; rather, we exhibit different styles in different niches.…”

Section: Individualization and Entrenchmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

223

184

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In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and its related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the "extended-mind" view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world in affectivity. Sterelny's Scaffolded MindSterelny (2010) distinguishes various dimensions of what he calls the scaffolded mind. This term refers to the idea that the mind is "environmentally supported," more specifically that 2 cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain as well as amplify their cognitive abilities. Sterelny in particular draws on the niche-construction model (Odling-Smee et al., 2003) to characterize the scaffolded mind. According to this model, organisms carve out environmental niches to which they then adapt; in this way, processes of manipulation of the environment feed back onto the manipulating organism and transform it, often increasing the organism's chances of survival. A classic example of niche construction is the dam-building activity of the beaver, which changes the environment where the beaver lives, which in turn affects the beaver's behavior and that of its progeny.Niche construction comes in different varieties (Sterelny, 2003, chapter 8). For example, organisms physically modify their habitat, constructing structures (e.g. shelters, nests, dams) that modify how the environment impacts on them. Social organization is also a form of niche construction, for it creates a certain set of conditions that change the selective landscape. What Sterelny (2010) calls the scaffolded mind refers to processes of epistemic niche construction characteristic of human agency, consisting primarily in making cognitive tools and assembling informational resources to scaffold intelligent action: written language, mathematical notations, calendars, watches, telescopes, computers, etc. Moreover, in the human case, environmental scaffolding exerts its influence across generations in a particularly profound way, via the transmission of ecological and technical expertise (what Sterenly calls "intergenerational social learning"; see also Sterelny, 2012).Sterelny introduces the scaffolded-mind view as an alternative to the extended-mind view (ExM henceforth), first formulated by Clark & Chalmers (1998) and further elaborated by Andy Clark and others (e.g., Clark, 2008;Menary, 2010b). According to ExM, sometimes the material vehicles that realize the mind encompass not just neural or even bodily activity, but also that of the material environment. Sterelny does not reject ExM, b...

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Section: Individualization and Entrenchmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Colombetti¹,

Krueger

2014

Philosophical Psychology

223

184

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“…This structure defines, for example, the coordinate system of my visual field and my proprioception. Different sensory fields are bound together to create a unified stream of meaningful experiences, united by a body with an established repertoire of habits, activities, and style (on style see Meacham 2013). In Husserl's terms, the constitution of my body is essential to the constitution of objects appearing to me and indeed to the constitution of space and time (Husserl 1997, §73).…”

Section: Illness Modifies Embodiment Meaning and Being In The Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophical Role of Illness

Carel¹

2016

Phenomenology of Illness

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“…This structure defines, for example, the coordinate system of my visual field and my proprioception. Different sensory fields are bound together to create a unified stream of meaningful experiences, united by a body with an established repertoire of habits, activities, and style (on style see Meacham ). In Husserl's terms, the constitution of my body is essential to the constitution of objects appearing to me and indeed to the constitution of space and time (Husserl , § 73).…”

Section: Illness Modifies Embodiment Meaning and Being In The Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Philosophical Role of Illness

Carel

2014

Metaphilosophy

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This article examines the philosophical role of illness. It briefly surveys the philosophical role accorded to illness in the history of philosophy and explains why illness merits such a role. It suggests that illness modifies, and thus sheds light on, normal experience, revealing its ordinary and therefore overlooked structure. Illness also provides an opportunity for reflection by performing a kind of suspension (epoché) of previously held beliefs, including tacit beliefs. The article argues that these characteristics warrant a philosophical role for illness. While the performance of most philosophical procedures is volitional and theoretical, however, illness is uninvited and threatening, throwing the ill person into anxiety and uncertainty. As such it can be viewed as a radical philosophical motivation that can profoundly alter our outlook. The article suggests that illness can change the ways in which we philosophise: it may shape philosophical methods and concerns and change one's sense of salience and conception of philosophy.

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What Goes Without Saying: Husserl’s Concept of Style

Cited by 18 publications

References 0 publications

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Scaffoldings of the affective mind

The Philosophical Role of Illness

The Philosophical Role of Illness

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