What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan

Abstract

For years, the U.S. government has been waging counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaida and other armed groups in safe havens and weak states. What explains the effectiveness of such campaigns? The variation in effectiveness may result from differences in select tactical, organizational, and technological capabilities of the counterterrorism state and its local partner, captured by the concept of the Legibility and Speed-of-Exploitation System (L&S). Empirical studies, including novel fieldwork data, on the U.S. drone war in Pakistan's Waziristan region from 2004 to 2014 reveal the influence of the L&S on targeted groups. From 2004 to 2007, a lack of U.S. counterterrorism capabilities aligning with the L&S allowed both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban to build their operational infrastructure, expand their bases, engage in extensive recruitment drives, and broker important local alliances. In contrast, as the United States made substantial improvements in the L&S from 2008 to 2014, the campaigns against both groups became increasingly effective. Both al-Qaida and the Pakistan Taliban experienced sustained reductions in operational capabilities, losses of bases, and high desertion rates; they also faced growing political challenges, including from within their own organizations. These findings contrast with the view that counterterrorism offers short-term gains at best and is counterproductive at worst.

Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence from a US Drone Program

“…3. For a theoretical discussion of the sources of such effects, see: Mir (2018) Hypothesis 1a All else being equal, violence decreases during the operation of the drone program Hypothesis 1b All else being equal, individual drone strikes will be followed by a reduction in violence Hypothesis 1b follows from our discussion of the kinetic effects of the drone program. We expect most individual drone strikes to inflict some form of kinetic damage on insurgent organizations, thereby having the potential to reduce violence.…”

“…Yet, disagreement persists about effectiveness of drones against asymmetric threats. While some scholars argue that drones can provide states with important advantages (Byman 2013;Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann 2016;Mir 2018), many question their efficacy for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (Kilcullen and Exum 2009;Boyle 2013;Jordan 2014;Hazelton 2017;Pape 2017). A separate literature on conventional air-power shows that air strikes against insurgents are counterproductive in the local battlefield (Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011;Dell and Querubin 2017).…”

Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration? Evidence from the Drone War in Pakistan

“…There is evidence that drone strikes have blunted the operational capabilities of al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (Johnston and Sarbahi 2016;Javier Jordan 2014;Mir 2018). By removing commanders and fighters from the battlefield, drone strikes reduce available manpower and experienced leadership for conducting attacks.…”

The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

“…Engaging in communication and punishment makes a leader more vulnerable to detection by counterterrorism agencies, so leaders may opt to exert less control as scrutiny by counterterrorism agencies intensifies. Mir (2018) illustrates qualitatively how drone strikes affect control within terrorist organizations in FATA: to avoid detection by drones, leaders eschewed use of communication devices, quit meetings, and were out of contact with operatives for months. A drone strike that hits a terrorist leader plausibly decreases control more steeply than a drone strike that misses a terrorist leader.…”