What do implicit measures measure?

Brownstein, Michael; Madva, Alex; Gawronski, Bertram

doi:10.1002/wcs.1501

Cited by 51 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 110 publications

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“…"), rather than, as is common in the literature, as an indicator of an implicit bias/attitude/association/prejudice/stereotype (e.g., "The manipulation caused significant changes in implicit biases/attitudes/associations/prejudices/stereotypes.") (for a similar recommendation and discussion, see Brownstein et al, 2019).…”

Section: Remedies To the Aforementioned Problemsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Indeed, many theories of implicit cognition fail to account for the findings of research using implicit measures (see Brownstein et al, 2019;Corneille & Stahl, 2019;. Despite this misalignment, it is the empirically unsupported and unjustifiable memes about implicit cognition (see Brownstein et al, 2019;Corneille & Stahl, 2019;;Greenwald & Banaji, 2017;Mitchell & Tetlock, 2017) which continue to dominate conversation, research, and policy about implicit biases/attitudes/associations/prejudices/stereotypes (e.g., Comey, 2015;Gladwell, 2007;Google, 2013;Starbucks, 2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

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If Nazi = Red, and Canadian = Red, does Red = Good or Bad? Testing the effects of valenced perceptual cues on Implicit Association Test performance

McCarthy¹

2019

Preprint

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After two decades of research on implicit social cognition, it has become clear many of the field's theories and practices need to be redressed. Addressed in the present paper are the assumptions and memetic ideas embedded in the language, theory, and measurement tools of so-called implicit social cognition, their historical and contemporary shortcomings, and solutions to avoid these shortcomings and improve scholarship in this field. Specifically, the present paper recommends researchers and theorists adopt more accurate and epistemically honest language in their work, and determine what measures of implicit social cognition measure through experimental research rather than through empirically unjustifiable assumptions. Contributing to this endeavour, the present paper includes an experiment testing whether performance on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) can be changed through the indirect activation of complex associations. Here it is demonstrated that performance on IAT appears to be unaffected by indirectly activated complex associations, ruling out a possible cognitive mechanism that could contribute to performance on the IAT.

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Section: Remedies To the Aforementioned Problemsmentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

If Nazi = Red, and Canadian = Red, does Red = Good or Bad? Testing the effects of valenced perceptual cues on Implicit Association Test performance

McCarthy¹

2019

Preprint

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“…The existence of such attitudes is typically revealed by indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and variations hereof (Greenwald et al 1998(Greenwald et al , 2009. A strong focus of current empirical approaches is put on the quality and validity of the IAT (see for an overview Madva and Brownstein 2018;Brownstein et al 2019). Furthermore, many philosophical discussions are concerned with the question of the nature and structure of implicit attitudes, for instance, whether these are belief-like states or dispositions (Mandelbaum 2015), in-between beliefs (Schwitzgebel 2010) or so-called aliefs (Gendler 2008).…”

Section: Disturbances Of the Sense Of Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foundations of a we-perspective

Crone

2020

Synthese

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What enables everyday collective attitudes such as the intention of two persons to go for a walk together? Most current approaches are concerned with full-fledged collective attitudes and focus on the content, the mode or the subject of such attitudes. It will be argued that these approaches miss out an important explanatory enabling feature of collective attitudes: an experiential state, called a "sense of us", in which a we-perspective is grounded. As will be shown, the sense of us pre-structures collective intentional states and is thus relevant to an adequate understanding of collective attitudes. The argument receives indirect support by insights into distortions of interaction due to implicit stereotypes.

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“…Forest plot of the meta-analysis is available in supplement at https://osf.io/a4wnv/ . 4 There is considerable debate about what implicit measures actually measure (Brownstein, Madva, & Gawronski, 2019). Some scholars have argued that they do not measure fully fledged "beliefs", but measure some other species of cognitive state, such as "aliefs" (Gendler, 2008), "patchy endorsements" (Levy, 2015), or "unconscious imaginings" (Sullivan-Bissett, 2018).…”

Section: The Affect Misattribution Procedures (Amp)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Measuring supernatural belief implicitly using the Affect Misattribution Procedure

Ross

Brown-Iannuzzi

Gervais

et al. 2019

Religion, Brain & Behavior

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Asking about religious beliefs, or lack thereof, is a sensitive and complex issue. Due to cultural norms, people may be motivated to respond in a socially desirable way. In addition, deliberating about beliefs may yield different responses than intuition-based responses. To develop a better understanding of the relationship between intuition and self-reported belief, we developed a new implicit measure of supernatural belief. Specifically, we adapted the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP) to measure supernatural belief. In a preregistered online study of 404 American participants, we found that the strength of associations between supernatural entities (e.g., god, devil, heaven) and the concept "real" (as opposed to the concept "imaginary") predicted self-reported supernatural belief and self-reported religious behavior, and these associations were of comparable magnitude to those found in studies where supernatural belief was measured implicitly using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). These results provide provisional evidence that the AMP can be used as an implicit measure of supernatural belief.

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What do implicit measures measure?

Cited by 51 publications

References 110 publications

If Nazi = Red, and Canadian = Red, does Red = Good or Bad? Testing the effects of valenced perceptual cues on Implicit Association Test performance

If Nazi = Red, and Canadian = Red, does Red = Good or Bad? Testing the effects of valenced perceptual cues on Implicit Association Test performance

Foundations of a we-perspective

Measuring supernatural belief implicitly using the Affect Misattribution Procedure

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