What Difference Does Culture Make in Multilateral Negotiations?

Mingst, Karen A.; Warkentin, Craig

doi:10.1163/19426720-002-02-90000003

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…In some cases, IOs may perform poorly because their missions do not reflect a clear consensus among states of what normative principles should be pursued or what underlying problem needs to be solved. For example, efforts by the UN to tackle human rights have been plagued by different views on human rights norms and on the fundamental question of whether the notion of "universal human rights" even exists (Mingst and Warkentin 1996). These situations risk leading to low levels of support and counterproductive activities on the part of states.…”

Section: The Sources Of Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of IO performance: A framework

2010

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Section: The Sources Of Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of IO performance: A framework

2010

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“…It included both a practically oriented “negotiating with …” subliterature 2 aimed at describing and advising how to negotiate with members of that culture, and a more comparative subliterature focused on explaining the influence or interaction of culture on negotiation processes and outcomes (see Gelfand and Dyer 2000; Jönsson 2002). In international relations (IR) literature, the debate has focused on the extent culture matters, if at all (see Faure and Rubin 1993; Mingst and Warkentin 1996; Cohen 2002; Avruch 1998). However, recently researchers have begun to propose models developing the conditions under which culture influences negotiations (e.g., Gelfand and Dyer 2000; Morris and Gelfand 2004).…”

Section: Literature Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

"Real Men" and Diplomats: Intercultural Diplomatic Negotiation and Masculinities in China and the United States

Ruane

2006

Int Studies Perspectives

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This paper develops a social identity approach to diplomatic negotiations that links research on gender and culture in negotiations by treating gender as an analytic category. By critically interrogating literature on diplomacy, negotiation, and masculinity in China and the United States and comparing hegemonic forms of masculinity and other ''ideal type'' gender and negotiator models, this suggests that in each culture:(1) dominant negotiating styles (generally integrativeF''win-win''For distributiveF''win-lose'') parallel dominant ideal typical males, (2) informal negotiating styles (reliance on personal relationships) parallel subordinate ideal typical females, and (3) creative negotiating tactics are possible by code-switching (changing relationship type and strategy style), or creatively reinterpreting existing models to address negotiation goals. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by linking previously separate but related subfields (''gender and negotiation'' and ''culture and negotiation'' research), adding to existing research frameworks, and creating the opportunity for improved international diplomacy.

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“…in its conventional neorealist or neoliberal guises, IR misses the way international society-as both a system of states and a world political economy-forms a competition of cultures in which the principles of sovereignty and self-help work to sanctify inequality and subjugate those outside of the centers of 'the West' [17] (pp. [1][2] Realism during the 20th and 21st century has "rendered culture not merely epiphenomenal, but invisible and mute" since the adoption of a realpolitik lens to deduce foreign policy a priori makes "culture invisible by suppressing difference in favor of sameness" [18] (p. 171) even though "culture is about difference" [2] (p. 138). The Latin-European, or more specifically, Judeo-Christian rationalization of law and morality instituting jus gentium as a positivist legal regime consisting of ratiocinative legal doctrines (i.e., contesting revealed Law) is asserted by J.H.W.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ottoman Imperium) in our case-which was historicized as existing "outside" the realm of jus gentium because its creed (Ar. [18] (p. 171) even though "culture is about difference" [2] (p. 138). The Latin-European, or more specifically, Judeo-Christian rationalization of law and morality instituting jus gentium as a positivist legal regime consisting of ratiocinative legal doctrines (i.e., contesting revealed Law) is asserted by J.H.W.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

De-Historicizing (Mainstream) Ottoman Historiography on Tanzimat and Tahdith: Jus Gentium and Pax Britannica Violate Osmanli Sovereignty in Arabia

Al-Kassimi

2021

Histories

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The (secular-humanist) philosophical theology governing (positivist) disciplines such as International Law and International Relations precludes a priori any communicative examination of how the exclusion of Arab-Ottoman jurisprudence is necessary for the ontological coherence of jurisprudent concepts such as society and sovereignty, together with teleological narratives constellating the “Age of Reason” such as modernity and civilization. The exercise of sovereignty by the British Crown—in 19th and 20th century Arabia—consisted of (positivist) legal doctrines comprising “scientific processes” denying Ottoman legal sovereignty, thereby proceeding to “order” societies situated in Dar al-Islam and “detach” Ottoman-Arab subjects from their Ummah. This “rational exercise” of power by the British Crown—mythologizing an unbridgeable epistemological gap between a Latin-European subject as civic and an objectified Ottoman-Arab as despotic—legalized (regulatory) measures referencing ethno/sect-centric paradigms which not only “deported” Ottoman-Arab ijtihad (Eng. legal reasoning and exegetic hermeneutics) from the realm of “international law”, but also rationalized geographic demarcations and demographic alterations across Ottoman-Arab vilayets. Both inter-related disciplines, therefore, affirm an “exclusionary self-image” when dealing with “foreign epistemologies” by transforming “cultural difference” into “legal difference”, thus suing that it is in the protection of jus gentium that “recognized sovereigns” exercise redeeming measures on “Turks”, “Moors”, or “Arabs”. It is precisely the knowledge lost ensuing from such irreflexive “positivist image” that this legal-historical research seeks to deconstruct by moving beyond a myopic analysis claiming Ottoman-Arab ‘Umran (Eng. civilization) as homme malade (i.e., sick man); or that the Caliphate attempted but failed to become reasonable during the 18th and 19th century because it adhered to Arab-Islamic philosophical theology. Therefore, this research commits to deconstructing “mainstream” Ottoman historiography claiming that tanzimat (Eng. reorganization) and tahdith (Eng. modernization) were simply “degenerative periods” affirming the temporal “backwardness” of Ottoman civilization and/or the innate incapacity of its epistemology in furnishing a (modern) civil society.

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What Difference Does Culture Make in Multilateral Negotiations?

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

The politics of IO performance: A framework

The politics of IO performance: A framework

"Real Men" and Diplomats: Intercultural Diplomatic Negotiation and Masculinities in China and the United States

De-Historicizing (Mainstream) Ottoman Historiography on Tanzimat and Tahdith: Jus Gentium and Pax Britannica Violate Osmanli Sovereignty in Arabia

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