What Can We Learn About Regulatory Agencies and Regulated Parties from the Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Regulatory Agencies’ Decisions? The Case of Croatia

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine regulatory agencies and regulated parties in an empirical study of administrative disputes initiated against the decisions of regulatory agencies in Croatia. We first aim to provide an overview of the status and trend estimates regarding these disputes; second, to answer the question how well does the system work from the perspectives of both the plaintiffs and the regulatory agencies; third, to identify the problem areas and to compare these with problem areas identified by the authors studying the broader area of administrative judiciary in Croatia, and finally to compare efficiency level of regulatory agencies to other public authorities in confirming the legality of their decisions and actions. Data on all administrative disputes against 12 Croatian regulatory agencies’ decisions in the 17-year period between 1995 and 2011 are used to identify the main characteristics and trends relating to these disputes. Data for 2012 to 2013 was also examined to identify initial changes and emerging trends in the new administrative judiciary system resulting from fundamental legal reform as part of Croatia’s process of accession to the European Union in 2013. The results show these administrative disputes to be often costly and timely with modest outcome for the plaintiff and impressive success rate for the most of regulatory agencies.

Challenging the regulators: Enforcement and appeals in financial regulation

“…Previous research has remained largely silent on the initial decision to challenge regulators. The few studies that deal with enforcement and judicial review in Europe and adopt a large‐N strategy privileged a descriptive and single‐country approach 2 (e.g., Bajakić & Kos 2016; Zulauf & Gava 2019; for an exception comparing two countries, see Mejia 2020). Their main focus was the performance of regulators in court (i.e., the success rate) and the identification of unlawful regulatory action.…”

Regulatory agencies and courts: interactions between administration and justice

“…Two papers analyzed issues related to efficiency and performance in regulatory institutional designs characterized by the coexistence of regulatory agencies and courts. In litigation brought before courts against decisions of twelve Croatian regulatory agencies, rulings issued between 1995 and 2011 were analyzed (BAJAKIĆ and KOS, 2016). Aspects such as the winning party, percentage of success, costs involved, and duration of the proceedings were analyzed.…”

Judicial review of regulatory decisions: Decoding the contents of appeals against agencies in Spain and the United Kingdom

“…Despite the relevance of judicial review as a supervision mechanism to control agency discretion pointed out by political science and public management scholars (Rose-Ackerman 2008;Maggetti 2010;Magill 2014;Jordana et al 2015;Koop 2015), and regardless of the proliferation and diffusion of regulatory agencies across European countries since the 1990s (Majone 2001;Levi-Faur 2005;Gilardi et al 2006;Jordana et al 2011), only few studies have performed empirical analysis of the contents of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions in European countries, and have mostly relied on scholarship from public law and comparative administrative law (Lavrijssen & Visser 2006;Betancor Rodríguez 2010;Larouche & Taton 2011;Cooper & Kovacic 2012;Bajaki c & Kos 2016;Solanes Mullor 2016;Psygkas 2017). This lack of empirical research contrasts with the extensive amount of literature generated on the study of judicial appeals against regulatory decisions in the United States courts system (Hall & Wright 2008;Pierce & Weiss 2011).…”