Challenging the regulators: Enforcement and appeals in financial regulation

Gava, Roy

doi:10.1111/rego.12405

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

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“…Third, various legal and administrative bodies are tasked with scrutinizing aspects of the activities of non‐majoritarian institutions. Decisions that affect the rights or duties of other actors can typically be appealed to courts, which evaluate their legality (e.g., Gava, 2022; Mejía, 2021). Audit offices—which themselves report to parliaments—assess the efficiency and effectiveness of spending in the public sector (Pollitt et al., 1999).…”

Section: The Accountability Landscape and The Role Of The Mediamentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability”

Koop

Vettimo

2023

Governance

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As non‐majoritarian institutions are deliberately insulated from electoral pressure and ministerial hierarchy, they face an accountability deficit. This deficit can be reduced by embedding the organizations in a wider accountability landscape with multiple forums. Of particular relevance in this landscape are the news media, who may not only serve as account‐holders, but can also reinforce other forms of accountability. Yet, we know little about the conditions under which the media cover non‐majoritarian governance, and the existence of “reinforced accountability”. Focusing empirically on news articles about the Bank of England (1997–2020), we trace coverage levels back to the announcement of key policy decisions and, to some extent, policy outcomes. We also find evidence of reinforced accountability, both in relation to parliamentary oversight and the Bank's own, voluntary account‐giving. These results provide reason for cautious optimism about non‐majoritarian accountability, at least in the case of a salient organization.

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Section: The Accountability Landscape and The Role Of The Mediamentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability”

Koop

Vettimo

2023

Governance

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Banking and the Swiss Financial Centre

Gava

2023

The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics

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Highly developed and diverse, the Swiss financial centre contributes substantially to the national economy. This chapter depicts the regulation and governance of the industry. The introduction situates the discussion in the broader study of business and politics. The second part presents the economic structure, importance, and diversity of market participants. The segmentation of the banking sector is discussed to highlight differences in size and business models. The third part outlines the main actors that shape the regulatory environment, such as specialized public bodies and business associations representing the industry. The fourth part provides an overview of the regulatory framework, mapping the evolution of legislation and discussing business self-regulation. The final part explores how parliament and political parties have treated financial regulation since the Global Financial Crisis.

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Judiciarisation des conflits dans la mise en marché collective des produits agricoles au Québec

Robert

2023

lex

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À titre de régulateur économique, la Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec (RMAAQ) tranche les litiges contractuels entre organisations de producteurs et acheteurs qui découlent du cadre réglementaire et conventionnel applicable. Depuis quelques années, plusieurs indices portent à croire qu’un phénomène de judiciarisation de la résolution des conflits s’est développé, se répercutant notamment sur l'efficacité du processus de la RMAAQ et la performance globale du système. Qu’en est-il ? Quels facteurs contribuent à alimenter ce phénomène s’il existe réellement ? Dans une logique exploratoire, nous répondons à ces questions en documentant les composantes du processus et leur évolution depuis une quinzaine d’années, au travers l’analyse de 17 entretiens conduits auprès des offices, des acheteurs accrédités et d’avocats actifs dans ce domaine réglementé. Ce que nous retenons est que la judiciarisation des litiges n’est pas tant quantitative, mais plutôt qualitative. Les résultats montrent une judiciarisation accrue des litiges due à la complexité des enjeux économiques, à la dynamique et les rapports entre les intermédiaires devant la RMAAQ et à la faiblesse des modes alternatifs. De plus, un cycle de contrôle judiciaire des décisions de la RMAAQ, dans la décennie 2000-2010, semble avoir été déterminant. Depuis, une culture juridique s’est réellement institutionnalisée dans le processus résolution des conflits et la RMAAQ tente de la prendre en charge. L’article contribue à décrire un phénomène aux conséquences potentiellement nuisibles aux coûts de fonctionnement de la mise en marché collective et à explorer une importante institution du secteur agroalimentaire québécois encore peu analysée.

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Challenging the regulators: Enforcement and appeals in financial regulation

Cited by 3 publications

References 47 publications

Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability”

Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability”

Banking and the Swiss Financial Centre

Judiciarisation des conflits dans la mise en marché collective des produits agricoles au Québec

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