What anti-individualists cannot know a priori

Nuccetelli, Susana

doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00148

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…See Nuccetelli (1999), Brown (2004), and Farkas (2008) for relevant discussion. One can point out that there is a straightforward way of resisting the Armchair Access Problem.…”

Section: A Clarificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Armchair Access and Imagination

Fratantonio

2018

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I focus on the Armchair Access Problem for E=K as presented by Nicholas Silins, and I argue, contra Silins, that it does not represent a real threat to E=K. More precisely, I put forward two lines of response, both of which put pressure on the main assumption of the argument, namely, the Armchair Access thesis. The first line of response focuses on its scope, while the second line of response focuses on its nature. The second line of response is the most interesting one, for it represents the framework within which I develop a novel account of second-order knowledge, one that involves evaluation of counterfactual conditionals and the employment of our imaginative capacities, i.e., an imagination-based account of second-order knowledge. The two lines of response are shown to be jointly compatible and mutually supportive. I then conclude that the Armchair Access Problem is not a challenge for E=K, yet it relies on the ambiguity of the notion of armchair knowledge underpinning the Armchair Access thesis.1 Henceforth, when I refer to Externalism, I have in mind what here I call, following Silins, Evidential Externalism, rather than more traditional varieties of externalism about epistemic justification, e.g., process reliabilism. For an overview of the main arguments and motivations behind Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism, see Fratantonio (forthcoming).

show abstract

“…See Nuccetelli (1999), Brown (2004), and Farkas (2008) for relevant discussion. One can point out that there is a straightforward way of resisting the Armchair Access Problem.…”

Section: A Clarificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, in the a priori/a posteriori debate, introspection is generally not taken to be a priori knowledge. See Nuccetelli (1999), Brown (2004), and Farkas (2008) for relevant discussion.…”

Section: A Clarificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Armchair Access and Imagination

Fratantonio

2018

Dialectica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…7 See also (McKinsey 1997(McKinsey , 2002(McKinsey , 2003. 8 See for instance (Boghossian 1997), (Brewer 2000), (Brown 1995(Brown , 1999(Brown , 2003(Brown , 2004, (Brueckner 1992(Brueckner , 2000(Brueckner , 2002(Brueckner , 2003(Brueckner , 2004a, (Davies 1998(Davies , 2000(Davies , 2003, (Ebbs 2003), (Falvey 2000), (McLaughlin 2003), (McLaughlin & Tye 1998), (Noonan 2000), (Noordhof 2004), (Nuccetelli 1999), (Raffman 1998), (Wright 2000(Wright , 2003.…”

Section: Reductio Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As I see it, the answer is probably no. Davidson's 10 The ambiguity of the concept of a priori is worth stressing (Nuccetelli 1999): in the first premise it indicates non-inferential knowledge, while in this second premise it is exactly a case of inferential knowledge. Nevertheless, we can skip over this objection by identifying a more general notion of a priori, which encapsulates all non-empirical knowledge (both inferential and non-inferential).…”

Section: Reductio Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Davidson, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism

Amoretti¹

2008

Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Subject's Point of View

Farkas

2008

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This book defends a conception of the mind that is inspired by some of Descartes's writings. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended is not dualism — which is not adopted here — but internalism about the mind. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted thesis of externalism, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view that the mind is autonomous with respect to its environment: although it is obviously influenced by things in the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. The first part of the book argues that privileged accessibility is the mark of the mental, and that this thesis is strongly tied to criteria of personhood. The second part argues that internalism is best formulated as the thesis that mental features are determined by the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental life, and that the externalist denial of this thesis is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Hence, externalism is in conflict with the conception of the mind and personhood defended in the first part of the book. Supporters of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; this book answers these criticisms and argues for an uncompromising internalist Cartesian theory of the mind.

show abstract

What anti-individualists cannot know a priori

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Armchair Access and Imagination

Armchair Access and Imagination

Davidson, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism

The Subject's Point of View

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About