Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory

Abstract

In the past 10–15 years, an increasing number of revisionist scholars have rejected the most significant elements of the argument about the centrality of the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the evolution and structure of international society. At the same time, the prominence of this argument has grown in the English School and constructivist international relations scholarship. I deconstruct the function of the Westphalian narrative to explain its pervasiveness and persistence. I argue that it was first developed by nineteenth century imperial international jurists and that the Westphalian narrative perpetuates a Eurocentric bias in international relations theory. This bias maintains that Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a normative divergence between European international relations and the rest of the international system. This dualism is predicated on the assumption that with Westphalia European states had solved the anarchy problem either through cultural or contractual evolution. Non‐European states, lacking this European culture and social contract, remained in anarchy until the European states allowed them to join the international society—upon their achievement of the “standards of civilization.” This Westphalian narrative distorts the emergence of the modern international system and leads to misdiagnoses of major problems of contemporary international relations. Furthermore, their commitment to the Westphalian narrative prevents international relations scholars from adequately theorizing about international interdependencies and accommodating global pluralism.

When Domestic Politics and International Relations Intermesh: Subordinated Publics' Factional Support Within Layered Power Structures

“…Nationalists and conservatives in the West sometimes claim that power centralization and projection, or outside control of “peripheries,” is necessary to maintain stability (e.g., Braithwaite ; Rathbun ). Liberals make similar claims under the assumption that imposition of Western political and socioeconomic developmental paths would lead to progressive liberalization, democratization, and/or cooperation under the international order (Kayaoglu ; see Ayoob ; Ikenberry ). Both sides assume that hegemony is the most stable form of open international organization in a unipolar system (e.g., Katzenstein et al.…”

“…Both sides assume that hegemony is the most stable form of open international organization in a unipolar system (e.g., Katzenstein et al 1998). But, as others have argued from various perspectives (e.g., Ravenal 1973;Snidal 1985;Richman 1991;Tickner 2003;Kayaoglu 2010), hegemonic stability as envisioned theoretically may not be enacted or perceived as such, especially in nations of the "periphery" (e.g., Hinnebusch 2005). The policies used to enact hegemonic stability have not manifested the theoretical ideal because they tend to ignore translevel effects, nonstate actors and indulge in counter-productive exploitation of power asymmetries.…”

“¿De dónde eres realmente?” Apuntes sobre las ciencias sociales y la “crisis de la sociedad homogénea”

“…Constitutivo del contrato social liberal es el "contrato racial" que produce e instituye racialmente la legitimidad política, sobre todo la naturaleza/derecho de auto-gobierno, la soberanía, y los términos de la legalidad de la ocupación y gobierno colonial de territorios y poblaciones. La ocupación e invención de América como "el Nuevo Mundo" y la soberanía westphaliana fueron dos procesos cruciales (Mills, 1997;Goldberg, 2002;Kayaoglu, 2010). La construcción del Estado-Nación y la significación de Europa como "entrada en la modernidad" pueden ser, por tanto, interpretadas como un doble proceso de europeanización/competición entre diferentes proyectos de nacionalización y de cooperación/competición en y por el gobierno colonial.…”

Analysing Foreign Policy in a Context of Global Governance

“…Confronting novel types of foreign policy actors demands not only quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced outreach, that is turning towards all different types of 'others', but necessitates also an increasing ability to understand, recognize, cope with and confront 'difference' at the stage of foreign policy-making. For many, this also implies a willingness to move beyond the dominant Western perspectives and categories and to transcend the Westphalian and modernization paradigms (Tickner, 2003;Kayaoglu, 2010;Tickner and Blaney, 2012). This is rendered more complex by the constantly evolving nature of global governance: the 'others' are less predictable, more in flux as entities and in terms of their foreign policy positions and actions than in the past.…”