Weighing the Costs of Accountability: The Role of Institutional Incentives in Pursuing Transitional Justice

Abstract

In this manuscript I challenge the central argument that transitional justice in postrepressive states is largely a function of the relative power of new versus old elites. I argue instead that a new regime's will to pursue transitional justice is closely linked to its capacity to provide goods and services expected by voters, and that institutional variation plays an important role in determining how this process plays out. The mechanisms that post-oppositionists utilize to enhance their long-term political viability depend primarily on institutionally determined reward structures, which should also determine support and opposition to a given justice policy. I evaluate this argument with an in-depth examination of elite perceptions concerning transitional justice policies in two diverse post-communist states: Poland and Serbia.The past two decades have witnessed increased attention to questions of transitional justice, those legal responses to a former regime's repressive acts that follow a change in political systems. The transitional justice literature occupies a broad interdisciplinary space that spans from anthropology to political science and law. It is not surprising that much of the justice debate is focused on normative or legal aspects of justice policy. Although the literature is quite vast and varied with regard to the independent variables responsible for the employment of accountability mechanisms, theoretical arguments for how and under what conditions we should expect to see specific measures implemented remain quite limited; a common thread running through many of the existing arguments hinges on power-based constraints. According to the simplified version of this argument, the stronger the new elites are relative to their predecessors the harsher the path of justice they might be expected to follow. The logic of the argument is intuitively appealing; it is easier to imagine Vladimir Lenin holding the head of deposed Tsar Nicholas II than Boris Yeltsin holding that of Mikhail Gorbachev.Clearly a new regime's formal power structure, perhaps prejudiced by the dynamics of the transition process itself, should have at least some effect on new elites' accountability

The Authoritarian Past and South European Democracies: An Introduction

“…As many scholars noted, some forms of transitional justice can enhance democratic consolidation in a number of ways, from demonstrating a split with the past and equality under the law to forging common historical understandings, 'but criminal accountability has the added plus of eliminating political opponents' (Grodsky 2008).…”

Las actitudes de los españoles ante las medidas de justicia transicional relativas a la Guerra Civil y al franquismo

“…Otras contribuciones académicas sobre las demandas sociales de JT se basan en LQYHVWLJDFLRQHV HWQRJUi¿FDV TXH LQFOX\HQ HQWUHYLVWDV \X REVHUYDFLyQ SDUWLFLSDQWH 7KHL-GRQ HQ HQWUHYLVWDV D VXEJUXSRV HVSHFt¿FRV GH OD SREODFLyQ FRPR ODV YtFWLPDV (Grodsky 2008;Strover y Weinstein 2004;International Center for Transitional Justice 2004;Espinoza Cuevas et al 2003), o en el análisis de los grupos de presión (Backer 2003). En resumen, con muy pocas excepciones, los académicos no se han basado en datos sistemáticos y generalizables sobre las actitudes del conjunto de la población de un país hacia las políticas de JT.…”

Determinants of Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice

“…This is problematic, because it cannot be assumed that there is a direct relationship between the demands promoted by organizations or pressure groups and the general preferences of the citizenry. 3 Moreover, many of the existing scholarly contributions on bottom-up demands for TJ draw on ethnographic research including interviews and/or observational participation (Theidon, 2006;Ferreira, 1999), interviews with specific focus groups (Grodsky, 2008;Martín Beristain, 2008;Strover and Weinstein, 2004;ICTJ, 2004), or interviews with particular subgroups of the overall population, e.g.…”