2016
DOI: 10.1017/s0020589315000536
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Weathering the Storm: Legality and Legal Implications of the Saudi-Led Military Intervention in Yemen

Abstract: On 26 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched 'Operation Decisive Storm' on the territory of the Republic of Yemen following a request by that country's beleaguered government. Although it received no prior fiat from the UN Security Council and took place amidst a civil war, the intervention met with approval from numerous States, with only few critical sounds. Closer scrutiny nonetheless reveals that the self-defence justification, which is primarily relied upon, does not provide a convincing legal basis f… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…On March 26 2015, Saudi Arabia responded to appeals by Mansur Hadi to the GCC and the UN Security Council for an urgent military support by launching Operation Decisive Storm to prevent the Houthis from advancing and potentially capturing the city of Aden (Al-Karimi, 2015; Buys & Garwood-Growers, 2018; Russia Today, 2015; Ruys & Ferro, 2016). Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with support of other regional states and international actors led a coalition of troops to counter the Houthi militias who were focused on capturing Aden and with it the entire government of Mansour Hadi.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…On March 26 2015, Saudi Arabia responded to appeals by Mansur Hadi to the GCC and the UN Security Council for an urgent military support by launching Operation Decisive Storm to prevent the Houthis from advancing and potentially capturing the city of Aden (Al-Karimi, 2015; Buys & Garwood-Growers, 2018; Russia Today, 2015; Ruys & Ferro, 2016). Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with support of other regional states and international actors led a coalition of troops to counter the Houthi militias who were focused on capturing Aden and with it the entire government of Mansour Hadi.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Saudi Arabia justified its military operation in Yemen as a response to a “direct appeal” from a “legitimate” government of Yemen. The internationally recognized administration of Hadi based in Aden designated the rebellion mounted by Houthis as a direct threat to Yemeni national security and sovereignty (Nußberger, 2017; Ruys & Ferro, 2016, p. 62; Sharp, 2015). Additionally, Saudi Arabia besides emphasizing that the coalition was responding to safeguard civilian lives, the Saudi Kingdom was also anxious about prospective future or long-term consequences of a successful coup against an internationally recognized government in its domestic politics and also having to potentially deal with an Iranian-backed Houthi regime regarding its foreign policy interests.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Operation Decisive Storm—later renamed Operation Restore Hope—officially began on March 26, 2015, following requests by the ousted President Mansur Hadi to the GCC and the UN Security Council for “immediate and urgent” support to stop the Houthis and other fighters from advancing to and taking over the city of Aden (Al‐Karimi, 2015; Buys & Garwood‐Gowers, 2018; Ruys & Ferro, 2016). A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE and supported by several regional and international actors quickly mobilized troops to Yemen to fight the Houthi militias that were keen on overthrowing the government of Mansour Hadi.…”
Section: Turkey's Operation Peace Spring In Syria (2019)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…34 My view is that intervention by invitation is not an exception to the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter but rather avoids engaging the rule entirely. If a use of force has prior consent or is invited, it is not carried out 'against the territorial integrity or political independence' of a state and therefore cannot be seen as a breach of Article 2(4); 35 where there is consent to the use of force, Article 2(4) is 'inoperative'. 36 Likewise, the ICJ has asserted that interventions that have been requested by states will not violate the principle of non-intervention, rather than being breaches of the principle which are excused after the fact.…”
Section: Intervention By Invitation Within International Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%