In light of evolving practices of conflict-the move to remote, light-foot, long-term, 'liquid' interventions-interrogations into the manner in which one state can consent to the use of force by another on its territory (intervention by invitation) have become increasingly pressing. In Pakistan, the US carried out remote airstrikes for nine years on the basis of secret consent, raising the question of how secrecy impacts upon the validity of consent to the use of force: whether secrecy renders consent invalid or, put differently, whether valid consent contains a requirement of publicity. Examining, state responsibility, jus ad bellum, and examples of state practice between 1944 and the present, this article considers the question of publicity, finding that, though there is a tendency towards the publication of consent, in a doctrinal legal sense there is insufficient evidence to suggest an obligation to publicise. This article argues that, due to the absence of such a requirement, consent is not a rule that restricts the use of force, but one that enables it; it is a doctrine that lends itself to the service of hegemony and the projection of power by states, and it must be recognised as such.