Waste Load Allocation in Rivers using Fallback Bargaining

Mahjouri, Najmeh; Bizhani-Manzar, Mohammad

doi:10.1007/s11269-013-0279-2

Cited by 46 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Fallback bargaining can lead to the discovery of alternatives that serve as stable (feasible) compromises across regional actors . In water resources systems, fallback bargaining has been applied for conflict resolution in the Caspian Sea negotiations (Sheikhmohammady & Madani, 2008;Sheikhmohammady et al, 2010), waste load allocation (Mahjouri & Bizhani-Manzar, 2013), inter-basin water transfers (Jafarzadegan et al, 2014) and water allocation (He et al, 2018;. In cooperative water supply planning problems, fallback bargaining has the potential to assist utilities in navigating robustness conflicts to discover compromise portfolios for regional systems.…”

Section: Research Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying Actionable Compromises: Navigating Multi‐City Robustness Conflicts to Discover Cooperative Safe Operating Spaces for Regional Water Supply Portfolios

Gold

Reed

Trindade

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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Regional cooperation among water utilities can improve the robustness of urban water supply systems to challenging and deeply uncertain futures. Through coordination mechanisms such as water transfers and regional demand management, water utilities can improve the efficiency of resource allocation and delay the need for new infrastructure investments. Though cooperation provides utilities with the potential for reduced cost strategies for improving the reliability of their services, two important challenges are worthy of careful consideration. First, regional utilities often have to navigate robustness conflicts stemming from potential asymmetries in their risk exposure, demand dynamics, and the availability of supply resources. Second, successful implementation of candidate compromise water portfolios requires that cooperating utilities understand their operational tolerances to deviations from the recommended regional actions (“imperfect implementation”). This study contributes a framework for identifying compromises across regional robustness conflicts and quantifying tolerances to implementation uncertainties. The framework is demonstrated on a system of four interdependent but institutionally independent water utilities in the Research Triangle region of North Carolina that are confronting robustness conflicts given asymmetries in their vulnerabilities to growing demands and hydroclimatic uncertainties. Our findings highlight that seemingly balanced compromise management strategies can yield significant and potentially surprising unintended consequences that could degrade regional cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in regional robustness can be amplified with modest deviations from their agreed upon actions. Results of this analysis are broadly applicable to water supply regionalization as a global challenge and provide insights for discovering robust compromises and safe operating spaces for multi‐actor water supply systems.

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Section: Research Articlementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying Actionable Compromises: Navigating Multi‐City Robustness Conflicts to Discover Cooperative Safe Operating Spaces for Regional Water Supply Portfolios

Gold

Reed

Trindade

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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“…Bargaining techniques can help create an arrangement to reach broad agreements among stakeholders on specific policies through negotiation, considering the shared resources' utilities and limitations (Madani, 2010). Thus, these techniques have been used in many water resources management studies to analyze stakeholders' potential behaviors (Carraro & Sgobbi, 2008;Mahjouri & Bizhani-manzar, 2013;Xu et al, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran

2021

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Cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has led to environmental benefits in some groundwater markets by restricting and economically reallocating water permits. However, top-down approaches for capping permits may face resistance of every affected stakeholder. This paper presents an efficient policy framework to improve the implementation of C&T policies in a real shared aquifer in Iran. To this end, groundwater permits for water-selling farms are capped through a bottom-up capping (BUC) policy. A policy analysis that employs static and dynamic bargaining techniques incorporates farms' utilities. Results reveal that the bargaining techniques propose more acceptable capping strategies than the top-down approach. The BUC policy analysis introduces the proposed strategy by dynamic bargaining as the tradable groundwater permits. The effects of irrigation water sales to the industry sector, evaluated using a cooperative game-based optimization model, show that with the fair reallocation of water trading benefits, the current net benefits of agriculture and industry sectors increase by 55 and 27%, respectively. Furthermore, farms reduce their groundwater withdrawals by 35% compared with the current mode. Therefore, the BUC policy for inter-sectoral groundwater trading under dynamic bargaining can lead to the sustainable use of limited groundwater resources by facilitating the capping strategies and improving the water permits productivity.

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“…One factor that needs to be considered to achieve this goal is to align the spatial resolution of the allocation policy and the political management zones. Most of the previous studies in China were done at the river basin spatial scale and mainly focused on quantifying the impact of the upstream activities on the downstream allocation [ 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 ]. Studies at practical spatial management scales are very important for the implementation of proposed emission allocation schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Historical Accountability for Equitable, Efficient, and Sustainable Allocation of the Right to Emit Wastewater in China

Huang

Butsic

et al. 2018

Entropy

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Establishing policies for controlling water pollution through discharge permits creates the basis for emission permit trading. Allocating wastewater discharge permits is a prerequisite to initiating the market. Past research has focused on designing schemes to allocate discharge permits efficiently, but these schemes have ignored differences among regions in terms of emission history. This is unfortunate, as fairness may dictate that areas that have been allowed to pollute in the past will receive fewer permits in the future. Furthermore, the spatial scales of previously proposed schemes are not practical. In this article, we proposed an information entropy improved proportional allocation method, which considers differences in GDP, population, water resources, and emission history at province spatial resolution as a new way to allocate waste water emission permits. The allocation of chemical oxygen demand (COD) among 30 provinces in China is used to illustrate the proposed discharge permit distribution mechanism. In addition, we compared the pollution distribution permits obtained from the proposed allocation scheme with allocation techniques that do not consider historical pollution and with the already established country plan. Our results showed that taking into account emission history as a factor when allocating wastewater discharge permits results in a fair distribution of economic benefits.

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Waste Load Allocation in Rivers using Fallback Bargaining

Cited by 46 publications

References 13 publications

Identifying Actionable Compromises: Navigating Multi‐City Robustness Conflicts to Discover Cooperative Safe Operating Spaces for Regional Water Supply Portfolios

Identifying Actionable Compromises: Navigating Multi‐City Robustness Conflicts to Discover Cooperative Safe Operating Spaces for Regional Water Supply Portfolios

Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran

Historical Accountability for Equitable, Efficient, and Sustainable Allocation of the Right to Emit Wastewater in China

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