Was Kontextualisten nicht wissen

Brendel, Elke

doi:10.1524/dzph.2003.51.6.1015

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…There has been a number of responses, most of which accept that there is at least a prima facie case for the knowability problem. Brendel (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009) and Wright (2005) reject EC on the grounds of the knowability problem. Brueckner and Buford (2009) and Williamson (2001) think that the knowability problem exists, but does not have any further effects: inability to knowingly state a theory undermines the possibility of asserting the position, but does not touch upon its tenability.…”

Section: The Knowability Problem and Its Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

Freitag¹

2015

Episteme

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It has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.

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Section: The Knowability Problem and Its Solutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

Freitag¹

2015

Episteme

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“…Here is the first version of the problem (to a large degree I will follow Brendel 2003, 1026‐1027 and Wright 2005, 243 in the description of the problem 4 ). According to it, contextualism can be shown to entail a contradiction.…”

Section: The Problem (First Version)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8 8 Brendel 2003 deals with them in one step, as one principle. Here is one way to analyze it into those two components.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Given the importance of the problem, it is astonishing that so far (at least to my knowledge) there has been little detailed and direct discussion of it. Elke Brendel’s (2003, see also 2005) and Crispin Wright’s (2005) recent papers are exceptions (see also short passages in Veber 2004, 268‐269, Brueckner 2004, Engel 2005, 58, 63, Kompa 2005, 18‐19, 25‐26, Kallestrup 2005, Steup 2005, sec.1‐2, 6). However, they have started a debate which could quickly gain much more momentum.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Contextualism and the Factivity Problem

Baumann

2008

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.

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“…6 See DeRose (2000) for a fuller discussion of ''lost knowledge''. 7 For a formal demonstration that, in high standards contexts, one cannot know that one has low standards knowledge, see Brendel (2003). 8 DeRose acknowledges this very point: ''Thus, on our solution, we do know, for instance, that we're not BIVs, according to ordinary low standards for knowledge.…”

Section: Skeptic: Hmmmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox

Engel

2004

Erkenntnis

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Skeptics try to persuade us of our ignorance with arguments like the following: 1. I don't know that I am not a handless brain-in-a-vat [BIV]. 2. If I don't know that I am not a handless BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. Therefore, 3. I don't know that I have hands. The BIV argument is valid, its premises are intuitively compelling, and yet, its conclusion strikes us as absurd. Something has to go, but what? Contextualists contend that an adequate solution to the skeptical problem must: (i) retain epistemic closure, (ii) explain the intuitive force of skeptical arguments by explaining why their premises initially seem so compelling, and (iii) account for the truth of our commonsense judgment that we do possess lots of ordinary knowledge. Contextualists maintain that the key to such a solution is recognizing that the semantic standards for 'knows' vary from context to context such that in skeptical contexts the skeptic's premises are true and so is her conclusion; but in ordinary contexts, her conclusion is false and so is her first premise. Despite its initial attractiveness, the contextualist solution comes at a significant cost, for contextualism has many counterintuitive results. After presenting the contextualist solution, I identify a number of these costs. I then offer a noncontextualist solution that meets the adequacy constraint identified above, while avoiding the costs associated with contextualism. Hence, one of the principal reasons offered for adopting a contextualist theory of knowledge -its supposedly unique ability to adequately resolve the skeptical problem -is undermined.

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Was Kontextualisten nicht wissen

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem

What’s Wrong with Contextualism, and a Noncontextualist Resolution of the Skeptical Paradox

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