2008
DOI: 10.1080/01402390802197860
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WasSmugliankaa Lunatic or aSiguranţa's Agent-Provocateur? Peculiarities of the Soviet Partisan Struggle in the Western Borderlands

Abstract: Soviet partisans faced formidable challenges in regions annexed after the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In the pre-1939 territories, most partisans were locals; they operated within a familiar, often friendly social environment; their political goals were secondary to their military ones; and they targeted the Axis forces and their collaborators. In the western provinces, however, most partisans were outsiders; their political objectives dominated others; and they fought local nationalists as much as they did the Axis. Bo… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The main local agents of the government during this period were Soviet partisans, who launched their first raids in the region during the autumn of 1942. The OUN, which sought to establish an independent Ukrainian state, saw the partisans as a more dangerous rival than the German security forces, particularly as the local population grew increasingly hostile to the Nazis and were eager to support any force that would militarily challenge them (Statiev, 2008). In response to partisan raids, nationalist forces loyal to Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) organized their own armed militia (UPA) in late 1942, and focused the bulk of their subsequent military activity against Soviet agents.…”
Section: Illustrative Example: Soviet Counterinsurgencymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The main local agents of the government during this period were Soviet partisans, who launched their first raids in the region during the autumn of 1942. The OUN, which sought to establish an independent Ukrainian state, saw the partisans as a more dangerous rival than the German security forces, particularly as the local population grew increasingly hostile to the Nazis and were eager to support any force that would militarily challenge them (Statiev, 2008). In response to partisan raids, nationalist forces loyal to Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) organized their own armed militia (UPA) in late 1942, and focused the bulk of their subsequent military activity against Soviet agents.…”
Section: Illustrative Example: Soviet Counterinsurgencymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although nationalist guerillas were initially more numerous than the partisans, they were not as well organized and faced a public relations problem due to perceptions of collaboration with the Germans. The UPA was indeed effective at frustrating partisan operations against the Wehrmacht, but also faced a war on multiple fronts against internal political enemies, ethnic Poles, Soviet collaborators and -for six months in 1943, largely in response to public pressure -against occupying German authorities (Statiev, 2008). Given the population's response to repressive German occupation policies (Dallin, 1981), an expectation of civilian balancing prevailed.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%