The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands

Statiev, Alexander

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511730399

Cited by 64 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Partisans dwelled in poverty; they were dependent on food provisions donated by, or, in some cases, extorted from the local population. They mainly lived in secret bunkers, claustrophobically tiny spaces dug in the forest, expecting support from the West that never arrived (Statiev 2010). It is very likely that these photographs were created in order to add an aesthetic dimension, perhaps as a memento of prewar life, and they were framed by the curators exactly as such (this part of the exhibition being titled "Life Continues").…”

Section: Overflow In Strategic Disclosuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Overflow of Secrets

Rindzevičiūtė¹

2015

Current Anthropology

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Section: Overflow In Strategic Disclosuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Overflow of Secrets

Rindzevičiūtė¹

2015

Current Anthropology

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“…The role of the KGB in Soviet rule is the subject of Knight (1990), Albats (1995), Weiner (2006);Fedor (2011), andHornsby (2014). The establishment of Soviet rule in the Baltic has been mapped out by Reklaitis (2007), Tannberg (2010), Statiev (2010), and Weiner and Rahi-Tamm (2012). Mass disturbances under communism are catalogued by CIA (1983) and Kozlov (1999); on the bloody suppression of particular outbreaks see Baron (2001) and Barenberg (2014).…”

Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour: Managing Threats to State Security in Lithuania Under Soviet Rule

Harrison

2015

SSRN Journal

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In Soviet Lithuania (and elsewhere) from the 1950s to the 1980s, the KGB applied a form of "zero-tolerance" policing, or profilaktika, to incipient threats to state security. Petty deviation from socio-political norms was regarded as a person's first step towards more serious state crimes, and as a bad example for others. As long as petty violators could be classed as confused or misled rather than motivated by anti-Soviet conviction, their mistakes would be corrected by a KGB warning or "preventive discussion." Successful prevention avoided the costly removal of the subject from society. This represented a complete contrast to the Stalin years, when prevention relied largely on eliminating the subject from society. Preventive discussions were widely practised in many different circumstances. KGB internal evaluations concluded that these discussions were extremely effective in preventing further violations. This was the front line of the Soviet police state; it was perhaps the largest programme for personally targeted behaviour modification anywhere in the world at that time outside the education sector. It was also a front line of the Cold War because the foreign adversary was seen as the most important source of misleading or confusing influence. My work in progress aims to understand the origins and operation of profilaktika, including how and to whom it was applied, how it worked on the individual subject, and its wider influence on the Soviet Union's social and political order.

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“…This essay explores the Soviet Union after World War II, a prime example of how victory "locks in" a political system. 2 Thus, in a mirror image of Wolfgang Schivelbusch's argument of how "cultures of defeat" encourage social and political innovation, 3 the Soviet "culture of victory" reaffirmed a dictatorial system of government and a command economy based on collectivized agriculture and centrally planned industry. 4 I argue that the Soviet culture of victory was, first of all, a culture of celebrating the victory of the Soviet system.…”

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The Soviet Culture of Victory

Edele

2019

Journal of Contemporary History

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The Soviet Union after the Second World War can serve as a prime example of how victory ’locks in’ a political system. In a mirror image of Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s argument of how ‘cultures of defeat’ encourage social and political innovation, the Soviet ‘culture of victory’ reaffirmed a dictatorial system of government and a command economy based on collectivized agriculture and centrally planned industry. At the same time, however, the war also engendered changes, which played themselves out somewhat subterraneously at first. They include a complex system of veterans’ privileges, a growing welfare state, a more routinized administration, and an economy where individual and family farming played a major role in the provisioning not only of the rural, but also of the urban population. Moreover, counter-narratives and counter-memories of this war could never be completely silenced by the bombastic war cult and would break forth at the end of the Soviet century. Finally, the economic and human costs of this victory were such that they formed a constant dark underbelly to the celebration of the ‘Great Victory’. This article surveys these contradictory legacies of the war and the ways in which they helped shape late Soviet society.

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The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands

Cited by 64 publications

References 25 publications

The Overflow of Secrets

The Overflow of Secrets

If You Do Not Change Your Behaviour: Managing Threats to State Security in Lithuania Under Soviet Rule

The Soviet Culture of Victory

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