War of words: the impact of Russian state television on the Russian Internet

Abstract

How effective is Russian state television in framing the conflict in Ukraine that began with the Euromaidan protests and what is its impact on Russian Internet users? We carried out a content analysis of Dmitrii Kiselev's “News of the Week” show, which allowed us to identify the two key frames he used to explain the conflict – World War II-era fascism and anti-Americanism. Since Kiselev often reduces these frames to buzzwords, we were able to track the impact of these words on Internet users by examining search query histories on Yandex and Google and by developing quantitative data to complement our qualitative analysis. Our findings show that much of what state media produces is not effective, but that the “fascist” and anti-American frames have had lasting impacts on Russian Internet users. We argue that it does not make sense to speak of competition between a “television party” and an “Internet party” in Russia since state television has a strong impact in setting the agenda for the Internet and society as a whole. Ultimately, the relationship between television and the Internet in Russia is a continual loop, with each affecting the other.

Fake News

“…They show that there is no distinctive difference between opinions shared by television viewers and Internet users (Cottiero et al 2015). Moreover, over 80% of Russians share negative attitudes toward politically controversial content being available online (Nisbet 2015).…”

“…At the core of the narrative is the victory in the Great Patriotic War, which is seen as the most "sacred achievement" in Russia's history. Consequently, labelling somebody "fascist" is a powerful way of appealing to the values of Russians, who associate WWII with fascist horrors and crimes (Cottiero et al 2015). In mainstream Russian media, the threat of fascism being spread in Ukraine was initially related to the ultra-nationalist 6 of 18 movements in the EuroMaidan protests.…”

“…Russian mainstream television has taken a key position in advancing the strategic narratives of the government, presenting stories about the cause, nature and resolution of the conflict to domestic and international audiences. These narratives have centered, on the one hand, on the hostility and self-interest of Western states behind the regime change in Kiev, and, on the other, on the idea of a fascist threat spreading in Ukraine (Cottiero et al 2015;Hansen 2015). Much of the discussion about Russia's information war focuses on the government-led creation of confusion and disinformation in the media (e.g.…”

The New Russian Nationalism

“…These are themes that have featured very strongly in Russian television news programming, reinforcing findings by other scholars that Russian TV has had a significant influence on popular discourse in Russia about Ukraine (Cottiero et al 2015).…”

Democracy, protest and public sphere in Russia after the 2011–2012 anti-government protests: digital media at stake

“…These users exploit a variety of media sources to get their information and analysis (up to 4 or 5 media outlets, both traditional and electronic), yet tend to seek the points that confirm their preexisting views (Volkov and Goncharov, 2014). Therefore, even digitally savvy publics may demonstrate high approval levels of the government and engage in the online discussions that praise the elites (Volkov and Gocnharov, 2014; see also Cottiero et al, 2015).…”