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Abstract:The 2011-2012 Russian protest mobilisations were largely enabled by the rise of social networks. Social and technological advancements paired to pave the way for the ''biggest protests since the fall of USSR' (BBC, 2011). Ubiquitous and uncensored social media facilitated the networking and mobilisation for this protest activity: liberal masses were able to share and discuss their grievances, unite and coordinate online for the offline protest. The digitally savvy protest public developed to confront the government, which appeared to be astonished by the scale of protest. Those mobilisations marked an important gap between the government's conception of the society and the real state of resistance. This paper studies three main hypotheses regarding the potential of the protest movement in Russia. The hypotheses were drawn from recent sociological, political and media studies on Russian resistance. Current research aims to contribute to the debate from the digital media perspective. It therefore evaluates three main assumptions: digital media have the potential to empower, dependent upon the relevant political, social and economic factors; digital media isolates protest publics and therefore may be more useful for the government than the resistance; recent censorship of digital media communication signals a tightening of both formal and informal restrictions against opposition and protest politics.This article uses theoretical and factual evidence on the limitations on democracy and the public sphere, and conceptualises the government's management of resistance in Russia during and after the 2011-2012 protests. It studies how the hybrid political regime in Russia balances restrictions on freedom of speech with strengthened state propaganda; how it mediates media oppression and invites self-censorship. Lastly, it examines how the state communication watchdog has recently focused its attention at the digital realm. This move confirms the importance of the online protest communication for the Russian political environment. Yet the state's acknowledgement of digital political resistance may lead to further oppression and curbing of this emerging component of Russian politics.

The late 2010s have seen the unprecedented rise of Russian rap culture on YouTube. This study delves into the unexplored area of the relationship between rap music, politics, and the Internet audience in Russia. It focuses on the analysis of the production of the most popular rap videos—their narratives, power relations, and socio-political themes, as well as the prevailing patterns in the discussion on socio-political issues by the YouTube audience. The study brings three contributions that identify the power relations in the Russian society that manifest in the field of rap music. First, the Russian-speaking users demonstrate a high level of criticality toward the pro-Kremlin rap music on YouTube and challenge the lies of propaganda rap. Second, pro-government rappers follow the Soviet authoritarian ethos and praise belonging to the collective of elites, while liberal ones adhere to the individual responsibility. Third, we demonstrate the prevalence of patriarchal gender values, including macho politics and unquestioned sexism, which are representative of gender politics in the country. This article proves the importance of socio-political commentary on YouTube and points to the rap videos as the popular hubs for the socio-political debates. Users flow to rap videos and utilize the comment section to have their say on the political context and power relations rather than the music, to engage with others, and to contribute to the emerging collective debate. The comment sections on these rap videos have a unique value for the Russian users who exploit them as the negotiation space in the void of other platforms for social dialogue in Russia.

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