War and interpreters

Abstract

This paper attempts to shed light on issues of trust, control, ethics and identity concerning military interpreters who use their language skills against the country or people of their own cultural heritage. It examines linguists (translators and interpreters) who worked in military intelligence and operations during the Pacific War and the occupation of Japan, and military linguists involved in the current context of the “global war on terror”. Drawing on Cronin’s notion (2002, 2006) of heteronomous and autonomous interpreting systems, this paper discusses different sourcing avenues of military linguists during and after the Pacific War: Caucasian linguists trained at US military Japanese schools as autonomous, Japanese nationals locally hired for the occupation as heteronomous, and Nisei (second-generation Japanese American) linguists as in-between. Parallels and comparisons are drawn between the ambiguous standing of those Nisei linguists and the situations of foreign-born US military interpreters and locally hired civilian interpreters in Iraq and Afghanistan. The complex and difficult challenges faced by military interpreters who utilize skills deeply rooted in their heritage against their own people or people of their cultural heritage should be visited in future discussion of government policies for recruiting, training and utilizing heritage language linguists in military settings.

A Taxonomic Analysis Proposal for Research in Diplomatic Interpreting

“…Department of State and press conferences (Fu & Chen 2019) or narrowly to translation and interpreting within a Diplomatic Mission -embassies, consulates as in Fuentes Luque (1999); Interpreting in Diplomatic Settings (more situational than the former) Buri (2015), Baranyai (2011). Other labels are: International Relations Interpreting (referring to supranational organizations) Reischlová (2012); Political Interpreting (referring mainly to international summits, also called summitry which seems to describe also the encounters between heads of state) Baigorri (2005); Brown (2008); Jiang (2013); Military Interpreting (referring to negotiations and treaties) Bowen & Dobosz (1990); Takeda (2009) and/or War/Peace Interpreting (defining intermediation in conflict) Baker (2006Baker ( , 2010; Escort Interpreting for Diplomats (referring to official visits) Weller (2004), or Executive Interpretation (conference interpreters accompanying political or business VIPs) as defined by Calliope 1 , an association recognised by AIIC; and Mediation in political settings Liao & Pan (2018).…”

“…However, neutrality may intervene at a preliminary stage when a diplomatic interpreter has a dilemma on whether to decline or take an assignment in which s/he is likely to convey ideas which are incompatible with her/his own beliefs since, as according to Jiang (2013:212), agreement to undertake a job implies (to varying extents) "siding with the party one interprets for". This point is made by Takeda (2009) or Baker (2006:143-149), who from a narrative theory perspective discusses interpreters' ethical conflicts in situations where a clash with their ideological principles arises. But ideology is not the only reason for refusal; as Freeman (2013) reports, the peril of losing face led him to refuse Nixon's conditions 6 .…”

Wartime interpreting during the Sino-Dutch War (1661–1662)

“…While to translate or not to translate had become an issue of power struggles in pre-modern warfare, the impact of the use of interpreters on the developments of international or inter-ethnic conflicts is being increasingly acknowledged and studied nowadays. Not only is the employment or training of autonomous interpreters highly preferred in order to address loyalty issues (e.g., Takeda, 2009), but also the ability to interpret intelligence and prevent mistranslation is becoming key to winning a war (Apter, 2006, p. 22).…”

Wartime interpreting during the Sino-Dutch War (1661–1662)

“…For example, Chinese interpreter Maurits refused to take bribes from Koxinga, who asked Maurits to urge his Dutch superiors to surrender Fort Provintia (Blusse et al, 2000, p. 360, p. 489). Hence, while the ethnicity and nationality of modern wartime interpreters may help determine whether or how much they may be trusted (e.g., Kelly & Baker, 2013;Takeda, 2009), this principle is not applicable to the case of the Sino-Dutch War.…”