Wanting, liking and welfare: The role of affective states in proximate control of behaviour in vertebrates

Abstract

Animals choose a course of action countless times each day. To do so, they need to prioritise their behaviour within a set of alternative actions and decide which of these actions to perform at any one time and for how long, that is, determine when the behaviour has reached its desired effect. This process has classically been called the proximate behavioural control mechanism. Several aspects contribute to this process: internal and external stimuli, the emotions that they elicit, motivation (wants), behavioural goals, valuation, decision‐making and its modulation by mood, and the assessment of behavioural outcomes (liking). I will address all these aspects in the form of an integrated conceptual model. In the process of behavioural control, options need to be valued, and I will refer to evidence showing that an affective hedonic process in respect to (future) reward and punishment heavily affects this value. Moreover, I view motivation, the force that finally drives a specific behavioural output, as being primarily influenced by affective states or even corresponding fully to them. Given the feedback in behavioural control by (dis‐)liking outcomes of behaviour, I reason that in respect to welfare it is more important for animals to reach proximate goals than to avoid negative stimuli. All behavioural choices are modulated, and I show how mood, a long‐term affective state, can cause such modulation. Proximate control of behaviour takes place in the brain, and I will briefly discuss how current and future brain research may elucidate how the brain computes these processes. Furthermore, the inclusion of affective states in the conceptual model raises the question of the subjective experience of animals, and I will address some of the important open questions in this area of research. I will conclude that neural studies cannot currently provide a detailed and general theory on the algorithms of proximate behavioural control. In parallel to further developing these approaches, I propose to strengthen a refined ethological approach with a focus on the states of “wanting” and “liking” in ecologically meaningful circumstances and with a strong ontogenetic (within species) and comparative (between species) component. I consider this ethological approach to be a highly promising step in understanding proximate behavioural control.

Symposium review: Scientific assessment of affective states in dairy cattle

“…More generally, tests involving activity should consider that an animal's ability to move might be compromised, especially after surgical procedures or drug use, potentially confounding results. On a more fundamental note, motivational paradigms provide a clear estimate of what animals want but this might not be identical to what animals like (Pool et al, 2016;Gygax, 2017).…”

Common Feeding Practices Pose A Risk to the Welfare of Horses When Kept on Non-Edible Bedding

“…Horses are adapted to a diet that is rich in structural fibres and low in energy (i.e., rapidly hydrolyzable carbohydrates) [7,8,18,26]. Due to the horses´evolutionary fitness benefit ("niche construction theory"), they have the ability to forage an unlimited amount of low energy and high fibre food (ultimate behavioural control mechanism) [27]. If there is an energy deficit, metabolic and gastrointestinal cues as well as external stimuli (e.g., food supply) will increase the horses´motivation to eat [28].…”

Examining affective structure in chickens: valence, intensity, persistence and generalization measured using a Conditioned Place Preference Test

“…Despite a dramatic increase in research interest in the topic of animal affect in recent years (for examples of recent reviews see: Bliss-Moreau, 2017 ; Gygax, 2017 , Paul & Mendl in press , Perry and Baciadonna, 2017 ; Weary et al, 2017 ), important questions remain about the structure and function of affective states in a wide range of species, including birds such as the domestic chicken. Punishing or aversive stimuli can vary in their severity, frequency, and the nature of their consequences.…”