Wage distributions by bargaining regime

Kohn, Karsten; Lembcke, Alexander C.

doi:10.1007/s11943-007-0023-6

Cited by 20 publications

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“…Two further advantages of the GSES, standing in contrast to the IAB linked employer-employee data set (LIAB; used e.g. by Dustmann et al, 2009), are that hours of work are reported and that earnings are neither truncated nor censored (Kohn and Lembcke, 2007;Fitzenberger and Reize, 2002). Moreover, even though the sampling design asks firms to provide data only on a fraction of their workforce, many firms in 2006 prefer to supply data on all employees.…”

Section: Data and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the heterogeneity in wage trends between West and East Germany, (see e.g. Kohn and Lembcke, 2007;Gernandt and Pfeiffer, 2007;Orlowski and Riphahn, 2009), we restrict our analysis to West Germany. The GSES provides precise information on whether an employee is covered by one of the collective bargaining regimes, i.e.…”

Section: Data and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…union wage contracts) in West Germany plummeted between 2001 and 2006 by 16.5 percentage points (pp) for male workers and by 19.1 pp for female workers as reported in the German Structure of Earnings Survey (see section 5). Union membership of male employees also dropped sharply in the past decades in Germany, whereas that of female employees has been more stablealbeit at a much lower level (Card et al, 2003;Schnabel, 2005, p.185;Kohn and Lembcke, 2007). Since collective bargaining is typically associated with wage compression (Fitzenberger et al, 2008;Burda et al, 2008), the weakening of collective bargaining is likely to contribute to the increase in wage inequality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the US and Canada, several studies suggest that deunionization affects men more strongly than women, thereby contributing to the closing of the gender wage gap (DiNardo et al, 1996;Fortin and Lemieux, 1997;Blau and Rica et al (2008);Fortin and Lemieux (1997);DiNardo et al (1996), and for Germany: Fitzenberger (1999); Gerlach and Stephan (2006);Fitzenberger and Kohn (2005); Kohn and Lembcke (2007).…”

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Rising Wage Inequality, the Decline of Collective Bargaining, and the Gender Wage Gap

Fitzenberger²,

2010

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10014.pdf Non-technical SummaryWage inequality has been increasing in many industrialized countries over the past decades. Parallel to this trend, coverage by collective wage bargaining has declined strongly in many economies (OECD, 2004). The gender wage gap has also declined in most of these countries. However, these three developments have rarely been investi- Our results show that wage inequality is rising strongly both for males and females, driven not only by wage increases at the top of the distribution, but even more so by real wage losses below the median. At the same time, we find a sharp decline in coverage by collective bargaining. Both coverage by sectoral-level bargaining and coverage by firm-level bargaining is falling over time. Our sequential decomposition results show that all workplace related effects (firm effects and bargaining effects) contribute to the strong rise in wage inequality. We find evidence that the reduction in bargaining coverage contributes in a sizeable way to rising wage inequality and that the bargaining outcomes allow for higher wage flexibility. Nevertheless, these effects are dominated by the firm coefficients effect, which is almost exclusively driven by the sector coefficients effect, meaning that between-and within-industry wage differences drive the observed rise in wage inequality. The drop in collective bargaining coverage takes place almost exclusively within sectors. In addition, personal coefficients contribute to some degree to the increase in wage inequality, again reinforcing the dominance of labor demand effects.In contrast, personal characteristics change in a way to reduce wage inequality. All this adds up to a stagnation of the overall gender wage gap, and only the strong improvement in personal characteristics of females results in a fall of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution. The drop in collective bargaining coverage hardly affected the gender wage gap. Despite these changes, the gender wage gap remains almost constant, with some small gains for women at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. A sequential decomposition analysis using quantile regression shows that all workplace related effects (firm effects and bargaining effects) and coefficients for personal characteristics contribute strongly to the rise in wage inequality. Among these, the firm coefficients effect dominates,...

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Section: Data and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rising Wage Inequality, the Decline of Collective Bargaining, and the Gender Wage Gap

Fitzenberger²,

2010

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“…Da hohe Lohnansprüche häufig mit genau solchen Argumenten legitimiert werden, sollte der Einfluss auf hohe Löhne größer sein als im unteren Bereich der Lohnverteilung. Durch die zunehmende Verbreitung von Bonuszahlungen am oberen Ende der Lohnverteilung wird dieses Argumentationsmuster zunehmend wichtiger(Lemieux, MacLeod & Parent, 2009; für Deutschland: Sommerfeld, 2013) -gerade in Betrieben ohne Tarifbindung. Beim Frauenanteil im Management kommt hinzu, dass es Frauen auf Ebenen unter dem Management aufgrund des reduzierten homosozialen Rekrutierungsverhaltens von Männern leichter fallen sollte, in höhere Positionen zu gelangen, sodass auch hier zu erwarten ist, dass der Effekt im oberen Teil der Lohnverteilung stärker ausfällt.…”

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In welchen Betrieben verdienen Frauen mehr? Der Einfluss betrieblicher Statusrelationen auf die geschlechtsspezifische Lohnungleichheit

Schweiker¹

2017

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Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwiefern die geschlechtsspezifische Lohnungleichheit in Deutschland von statusbasierten Ansprüchen im Betrieb abhängig ist. Grundsätzlich sollte sich die geschlechtsspezifische Lohnungleichheit verringern, wenn sich der Status von Frauen im Betrieb relativ zu ihren männlichen Kollegen erhöht. Es werden zwei Indikatoren für diese betrieblichen Statusrelationen entlang der Geschlechtskategorie betrachtet: Frauenanteil im Management und Unterschiede zwischen den Geschlechtern beim Besitz von Hochschulabschlüssen. Mit der Verdienststrukturerhebung von 2010 und Multilevel Modellen kann gezeigt werden, dass sich der relative Lohn von Frauen mit steigendem Frauenanteil im Management und mit zunehmenden Vorteilen beim Besitz von Hochschulabschlüssen erhöht. Diese positiven Effekte auf den Lohn von Frauen variieren zudem entlang der Lohnverteilung: Bildungsvorteile von Frauen wirken sich stärker positiv auf hohe Löhne aus, während der Frauenanteil im Management eher unteren Lohngruppen hilft. Schließlich sind die Effekte stärker ausgeprägt in Betrieben ohne Tarifbindung.

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