2016 Resilience Week (RWS) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/rweek.2016.7573305
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Vulnerability analysis of desktop 3D printer software

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Cited by 34 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…Examples from the closely related AM security literature (we provide a more detailed description in Section 7) are also numerous. Considering attack vectors, researchers have complained about the lack of the security features associated with design files or design file transfer [21], identified that the employed software and firmware have numerous vulnerabilities [22], exploited weaknesses in the communication protocol to highjack the session [23], or used social engineering to convince a user to open a malicious e-mail attachment [2]. Compromised elements include computers that store design files and control the manufacturing process [2,6], communication networks that connect these computers with the robotized manufacturing equipment [23], the firmware installed on the equipment [24,25], or even an in-situ quality control system [26].…”
Section: Threat Model and Focus Of The Papermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Examples from the closely related AM security literature (we provide a more detailed description in Section 7) are also numerous. Considering attack vectors, researchers have complained about the lack of the security features associated with design files or design file transfer [21], identified that the employed software and firmware have numerous vulnerabilities [22], exploited weaknesses in the communication protocol to highjack the session [23], or used social engineering to convince a user to open a malicious e-mail attachment [2]. Compromised elements include computers that store design files and control the manufacturing process [2,6], communication networks that connect these computers with the robotized manufacturing equipment [23], the firmware installed on the equipment [24,25], or even an in-situ quality control system [26].…”
Section: Threat Model and Focus Of The Papermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, authors in [114] have proposed a reverse engineering methodology for validation of the printed objects that can also be utilized for integrity assurance of the system. Availability Besides the commonly known tools such as [115] designed to help improve the availability of webbased services, authors in [116] have suggested using six tools to evaluate vulnerabilities and demonstrated them with code from open source projects.…”
Section: Prototypingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Secure route data Protocols against cloud security secure 3D printer [116] control [124,125] against DDoS on IoT [126] in cloud [119] DDoS on Cloud [109] against DDoS [109] of manufacturing systems using various IoT, CPS, etc. can only be secured if the underlying hardware is secured [145].…”
Section: Routing Protocolsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, communications protocols employed by desktop 3D printers can be exploited, enabling the retrieval of current and previously-printed 3D models, the termination of active printing jobs and the submission of unauthorized (new) jobs [13]. Software and firmware commonly used in desktop 3D printers contain numerous vulnerabilities [28]. A phishing attack can be used to install a backdoor that enables arbitrary, targeted manipulations of design files by a remote adversary [6].…”
Section: Additive Manufacturing Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%