Voting secrecy and the right to justification

Vandamme, Pierre-Étienne

doi:10.1111/1467-8675.12278

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 50 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…First, it contributes to the literature that discusses potential benefits and downsides of secret and non‐secret voting in modern societies (e.g. Brennan and Pettit 1990; Engelen and Nys 2013; Manin 2015; Offe 1989; Vandamme 2018), adding an empirical perspective to a hitherto largely theoretical scholarship.…”

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, the political science literature has so far treated the matter of voting modes largely as a dichotomy of secret vs. non‐secret voting (cf. Vandamme 2018). Condemnation of the latter as undemocratic and anachronistic partly stems from this conceptual reduction.…”

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Two extreme positions exist, one emphasising the negative, the other the positive effects of secret – and by implication also collective – voting (e.g. Lever 2007; Manin 2015; Schwartzberg 2014: 28–39; Seglow 2020; Vandamme 2018).…”

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Seglow 2020), nor to propose alternative voting modalities (e.g. Vandamme 2018), but merely to compare real‐world effects of those two (cf. also Gilljam et al 2010: 80 f.).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Democracy Beyond Secrecy: Assessing the Promises and Pitfalls of Collective Voting

Mueller

Gerber

Schaub

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper assesses collective voting as a specific mode of democratic decision-making and compares it to secret voting. Under collective voting, voters gather in one place and decide by the show of hands. We theorise two potential advantages and two disadvantages of collective voting so defined. We then draw on original survey data from one of the largest polities practising collective voting, the citizen assembly of the Swiss canton of Glarus. We find that both the promises and pitfalls of non-secret voting are exaggerated. Non-secret voting's suspected pitfallssocial pressure and abstentiondo not generally materialise in our sample, although for women they do appear to be relevant to some extent. However, the promises of collective votingenabling cue-taking and discursive bridging and bondingare equally realised to a limited extent only. Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die kollektive Stimmabgabe bei demokratischen Entscheidfindungen im Vergleich zur geheimen Stimmabgabe. Bei kollektiven Abstimmungen versammeln sich die Stimmenden an einem Ort und geben ihre Stimme offen und gleichzeitig ab: Das heisst, dass jede Person sehen kann, wie die anderen abstimmen, und ihrerseits von allen anderen bei der Stimmabgabe gesehen werden kann. Der Beitrag diskutiert zwei theoretische Gefahrensozialen Druck und Stimmenthaltungund zwei theoretische Chancendie M€ oglichkeit zum Cue-Taking und die St€ arkung des Sozialkapitals durch Bridging and Bondingeiner solchen kollektiven Stimmabgabe. Anhand von Umfragedaten aus dem Landsgemeindekanton Glarus nehmen wir eine empirische € Uberpr€ ufung der theoretischen Erwartungen vor. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass sowohl die Vor-als auch die Nachteile des nichtgeheimen Abstimmens € ubersch€ atzt werden. Die vermuteten Gefahren von nichtgeheimer Stimmabgabe spielen in unserem Sample zwar eine gewisse Rolle bei weiblichen Stimmberechtigten, lassen sich aber nicht generell feststellen. Umgekehrt werden allerdings auch die erhofften Vorteile kollektiver Stimmabgabe nur in beschr€ anktem Mass realisiert. R esum e: Cet article analyse le vote collectif comme modalit e de prise de d ecision d emocratique et le compare au vote secret. Le vote collectif se caract erise par le fait que les electeurs se r eunissent au même endroit et votent a la fois publiquement et simultan ement. Cela veut dire que, non seulement, chaque electeur peut observer comment votent les autres, mais aussi que ces derniers peuvent observer comment l' electeur exprime ses choix politiques. L'article discute d'abord deux risquesla pression sociale et l'abstentionet deux avantages potentielsla possibilit e de s'informer aupr es des autres au moment du vote (cue-taking) et le renforcement des liens sociaux (bridging and bonding)du vote collectif. Nous menons ensuite une analyse statistique a partir des r eponses tir ees d'un sondage men e dans le canton de Glaris, qui pratique la Landsgemeinde. Nos r esultats montrent que les craintes comme les espoirs visa -vis du vote collectif sont exag er es. Notre ech...

show abstract

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conceptualising Collective Votingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Seglow 2020), nor to propose alternative voting modalities (e.g. Vandamme 2018), but merely to compare real‐world effects of those two (cf. also Gilljam et al 2010: 80 f.).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Democracy Beyond Secrecy: Assessing the Promises and Pitfalls of Collective Voting

Mueller

Gerber

Schaub

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On the public justification framework under consideration here, we change the interpretation of individual ballots from signaling the options voters prefer to signaling the options that voters believe are publicly justified. Some accounts of voting have suggested incentivizing choosing options which are publicly justified, seeVandamme (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratic Public Justification

Motchoulski

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Democratic institutions are appealing means of making publicly justified social choices. By allowing participation by all citizens, democracy can accommodate diversity among citizens, and by considering the perspectives of all, via ballots or debate, democratic results can approximate what the balance of reasons favors. I consider whether, and under what conditions, democratic institutions might reliably make publicly justified social decisions. I argue that conventional accounts of democracy, constituted by voting or deliberation, are unlikely to be effective public justification mechanisms. I conclude that the limitations of conventional mechanisms can be ameliorated through the use of lotteries instead of elections.

show abstract

Artificial intelligence and the secret ballot

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we argue that because of the advent of Artificial Intelligence, the secret ballot is now much less effective at protecting voters from voting related instances of social ostracism and social punishment. If one has access to vast amounts of data about specific electors, then it is possible, at least with respect to a significant subset of electors, to infer with high levels of accuracy how they voted in a past election. Since the accuracy levels of Artificial Intelligence are so high, the practical consequences of someone inferring one's vote are identical to the practical consequences of having one's vote revealed directly under an open voting regime. Therefore, if one thinks that the secret ballot is at least partly justified because it protects electors against voting related social ostracism and social punishment, one should be morally troubled by how Artificial Intelligence today can be used to infer individual electors' past voting behaviour.

show abstract

Voting secrecy and the right to justification

Cited by 9 publications

References 50 publications

Democracy Beyond Secrecy: Assessing the Promises and Pitfalls of Collective Voting

Democracy Beyond Secrecy: Assessing the Promises and Pitfalls of Collective Voting

Democratic Public Justification

Artificial intelligence and the secret ballot

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About