Voting for Justices: Change and Continuity in Confirmation Voting 1937–2010

Polarizing the Electoral Connection: Partisan Representation in Supreme Court Confirmation Politics

“…Cameron, Kastellec, and Park (2013) uncover two types of polarization. First, as is well known, the Senate has become increasingly polarized over the last 30 years or so.…”

From Genteel Pluralism to Hyper-Pluralism: Interest Groups and Supreme Court Nominations, 1930-2017

“…Suppose, as we suggest and in line with Scherer's account, interest groups alter presidential agendas so the president dutifully delivers conforming nominees (Cameron, Kastellec and Park 2013). If this is true, it is easy to see that the U.S. Supreme Court is likely to become extremely polarized ideologically.…”

“…We can also leverage the theoretical foundation laid by studies of roll call voting on Supreme Court nominees, in particular the model developed in Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990). That model, as well as much subsequent work (see e.g., Epstein et al 2006, Cameron, Kastellec andPark 2013), shows that senators are more likely to oppose nominees who are more ideologically distant, as well as those lacking in legal qualifications, or "quality." We use these variables to uncover whether interest group mobilization displays similar tendencies.…”

“…Contention in the Senate Many scholars have noted the the rise of contentiousness and polarization in confirmation voting in the Senate (see e.g. Epstein et al 2006, Cameron, Kastellec andPark 2013). In a word, a process that once frequently culminated in a simple voice vote, now routinely ends with hotly contested, polarized votes.…”

Going Public When Opinion Is Contested: Evidence from Presidents' Campaigns for Supreme Court Nominees, 1930‐2009

“…Low-quality or scandal-plagued nominees may also find themselves in trouble in the Senate (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990;Cameron and Park 2010). Hence, presidents may need to go public on their behalf.…”