Votes for Women: Electoral Systems and Support for Female Candidates

Abstract

It is a well-established finding that proportional representation (PR) electoral systems are associated with greater legislative representation for women than single member systems. However, the degree to which different types of PR rules affect voting for female candidates has not been fully explored. The existing literature is also hampered by a reliance on cross-national data in which individual vote preferences and electoral system features are endogenous. In this study, we draw upon an experiment conducted during the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections to isolate the effects of different PR electoral systems. Participants in the experiment were given the opportunity to vote for real EP candidates in three different electoral systems: closed list, open list, and open list with panachage and cumulation. Because voter preferences can be held constant across the three different votes, we can evaluate the extent to which female candidates were more or less advantaged by the electoral system itself. We find that voters, regardless of their gender, support female candidates, and that this support is stronger under open electoral rules.

Ineffective and Counterproductive? The Impact of Gender Quotas in Open-List Proportional Representation Systems

“…Our analysis is only concerned with the analysis of how vote patterns differed between candidates of the same party. However, it has also been suggested that parties with a more gender-balanced party list might be able to attract more votes (Golder et al 2017). By using the varying levels of increase in the proportion of female candidates on the list, future research can provide an empirical test of this hypothesis.…”

“…One aspect that is frequently discussed as a potential source of gender discrimination is the electoral system (see, e.g., Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger 2014; Roberts, Seawright, and Cyr 2013; Schwindt-Bayer, Malecki, and Crisp 2010; Thames and Williams 2010; Valdini 2012; Vengroff, Nyiria, and Fugiero 2003). In particular, it has been shown how electoral systems that allow voters to cast preferential votes for individual candidates, such as open-list proportional representation (PR) systems, impact women's political representation (e.g., Allik 2015; Golder et al 2017; Górecki and Kukołowicz 2014; Holli and Wass 2010; Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz 2016; Kukołowicz 2013; Matland 1994; McElroy and Marsh 2010).…”

“…While some scholars have found evidence of a potential gender bias against women in voters’ decision-making process and candidates’ electoral success (e.g., Górecki and Kukołowicz 2014; Kukołowicz 2013; Millard 2014; Sanbonmatsu 2002), others have not observed such effects and argue that women are not disadvantaged at the ballot box (e.g., Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz 2016; McElroy and Marsh 2010). Some even argue that open-list systems have a positive effect on women's election chances, at least in specific contexts (e.g., Golder et al 2017; Kostadinova and Mikulska 2015; Kunovich 2012; Stegmaier, Tosun, and Vlachova 2014). Millard, Popescu, and Tóka (2013, 16), for example, conclude that open-list PR systems “usually help rather than hurt women candidates.”…”

Designing preference voting

“…7 In a context of limited partisanship, voters tend to rely on the personal characteristics of candidates to make up their mind (McDermott 1997). 8 These include their gender (Golder et al 2017; McElroy and Marsh 2010), physical appearance (Berggren, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2017;Rosar, Klein, and Beckers 2008), or geographical roots (Bol et al 2016;Jankowski 2016). Evidence 7 We do not consider here the possibility of panachage.…”

What explains preferential voting? A field experiment in Portugal

“…1 The understanding on the contextual and individual factors of preferential voting is thin, and this article seeks to flesh it out. We also contribute to an ever-growing field of experimental and quasi-experimental analysis of the impact of electoral systems and, in particular, voting rules (Laslier and van der Straeten, 2008;Blais et al, 2011Blais et al, , 2012van der Straeten et al, 2013;Laslier et al, 2015;Baujard et al, 2014;Blumenau et al, 2017;Golder et al, 2017), which can provide empirically robust and internally valid insights about the nature and magnitude of that impact. We do this by reporting an experiment which consisted in a exit poll with different ballot papers.…”