Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short‐term Opportunities of Anti‐immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden

Abstract

In contrast to previous studies on the political opportunity structures of anti‐immigrant parties, this article argues that voters’ perceptions of policy convergence between mainstream alternatives affect their short‐term propensity for supporting such partisan challengers. Drawing upon leading research in the field, two hypotheses about voters’ perceptions of policy convergence, in two policy areas (economic redistribution and immigration), are presented. The main findings in the article suggest that policy convergence between mainstream parties has a more immediate impact on the electorate than commonly recognised. Using unique data from Sweden, the article shows that perceived convergence between Swedish mainstream parties in the field of immigration policy increases potential support for the anti‐immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). Yet the results are the opposite when it comes to perceptions of convergence in the field of economic‐distributive policies. In contrast to widespread assumptions, the article thus finds that policy convergence between mainstream parties only appears to create short‐term opportunities for anti‐immigrant parties if it takes place on their own policy turf. These results indicate, in other words, that the potential electorate of the SD – which is a wider group than hard‐core xenophobes – is largely driven by preferences about immigration policy, rather than the short‐term urge to protest against mainstream parties. The article, therefore, concludes that the cordon sanitaire to isolate the SD in Sweden – which is underpinned by de facto convergence between mainstream parties on immigration policy – could improve, and is unlikely to curb, the short‐term electoral opportunities of this party.

Voices from the far right: a text analysis of Swedish parliamentary debates

“…Previous studies have found that the Swedish case corroborates the suggestions made by Meguid (2005Meguid ( , 2008, that strategic choices of mainstream parties do affect the electoral success of the radical right (Loxbo 2014). The dismissive issue strategy dominated the behavior of Swedish mainstream parties until 2010, a fact which seems to have reduced the support for the SD (Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013, Heinze 2018.…”

“…The disengagement has also been expressed as a solid cordon sanitaire -a blocking coalition between most or all of the mainstream parties, Downs (2001) -and as a demonization of the SD (Heinze 2018, Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013, Loxbo 2014, Saveljeff 2011.…”

“…The other two mainstream parties, the Social Democrats and the Left Party, were not part of the agreement, but neither did they oppose it. Furthermore, when those two parties formed a left-green minority government in 2014, they began their term by declaring that the content of that same agreement would also serve as the basis for their government policy (Loxbo (2014), Dahlström & Esaiasson (2013), (Dahlström & Sundell 2012, p. 362). A couple of months later the same left-green government was close to collapse when they failed to pass their budget through parliament (Jungar 2015, p. 197).…”

“…How mainstream parties respond to the rise of the radical right and whether they adapt to their policy positions is a matter of scholarly debate (Van Spanje 2010, Rooduijn et al 2012, Bale et al 2010, Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2016. Whatever the outcome, there is strong evidence that the success of radical right parties depends on the way the mainstream parties respond to them (Meguid 2005, Bale et al 2010, Abou-Chadi 2016, Han 2015, Loxbo 2014, Schumacher & Van Kersbergen 2016. In this article, we address mainstream party strategy, but from a somewhat different angle; while most previous studies have focused on electoral campaigns and policy proposals, we investigate parliamentary debates.…”

“…From a comparative perspective, the SD's success is profound; in spite of its compromising organizational background and its origins in the Swedish extreme right and white power movement (Rydgren 2002, Widfeldt 2014, the party has managed to adapt to and consolidate its position in the Swedish parliament, while also strengthening its position among the Swedish electorate in an unparalleled way (Widfeldt 2014), and it is now the third largest party in the Swedish parliament. The mainstream parties have responded to this by exclusion and what Downs (2001) calls "disengaging strategy", which has been expressed in many different ways, all aimed at politically isolating the SD: by ignoring and dismissing the party and its issues, by adopting policy positions as far as possible from the SD, by blocking coalitions (cordon sanitaire) and by demonizing the party and its representatives (Heinze 2018, Loxbo 2014, Saveljeff 2011, Dahlström & Esaiasson 2013). …”