Parliamentary Opposition on the Wane? The Case of Sweden, 1970–2014

Abstract

While it is commonly assumed that parliamentary opposition is on the wane in Western democracies, we argue that evidence supporting this established proposition is lacking. Therefore, drawing on unique data from the Swedish parliament (the Riksdag), between 1970 and 2014, this article breaks new ground by systematically testing the ‘waning-of-opposition thesis’. First, we explore patterns of cross-partisan cooperation by gauging the extent to which governments seek to accommodate the position of the opposition. Second, we study the degree of partisan conflict over time by mapping the degree to which the opposition politicizes and rejects government policies. Our findings directly contradict the waning-of-opposition thesis. In contrast to theoretical expectations, including the influential ‘cartel-party thesis’, the article finds that partisan struggles in general have intensified significantly over time. Therefore, the article casts significant doubt over the influential idea that parliamentary opposition is waning.

Constrained Politics: Labour Market Actors, Political Parties and Swedish Labour Immigration Policy

“…Party struggle thus seems to matter more than it used to, so that party ideology has become more promising as an explanatory factor to immigration policymaking (see Berg and Spehar 2013). Rather than being characterized by weakening left-right mobilization between the main parties, as has been suggested is the case for some policy areas by Oskarson and Demker (2015), the area of labour migration fits better into the description of Swedish parliamentary politics (Loxbo and Sjölin 2016) that points to increased politicization and partisan struggles. 2 While the authors do not aim to explain why conflict has increased, our study suggests that shifting institutional conditions on the labour market opened up for more partisan conflict in labour immigration.…”

“…At least until the 1990s, there was a considerable degree of cross-party consensus on immigration (Dahlström 2004;Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008;Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 371;Hammar 1999;Odmalm 2011). This description is sustained by a recent longitudinal analysis of parliamentary opposition in Sweden which shows that before the 2000s it was uncommon for opposition parties to reject government bills on immigration/integration policy (Loxbo and Sjölin 2016).…”

“…In this sense, labour immigration policy fits well into the description of Swedish party politicsincluding immigration policymakingbecoming more, rather than less, conflictual over time (Loxbo and Sjölin 2016). Also, the immigration issue and the generated cleavages are not sufficient to transform the existing party system (adapted from Hiscox 2001).…”

The Alleged Opposition Deficit in European Union Politics: Myth or Reality?

“…Dahl's pioneering study on opposition in ten western democracies (1966) dates back half a century, and it is striking that the research field on opposition since then has seen few scholarly contributions based on solid empirical data (for notable exceptions, see, Andeweg, 2013;Blondel, 1997;Christiansen and Damgaard, 2008;Helms, 2004Helms, , 2009Kaiser, 2008;Loxbo and Sjölin, 2017;von Beyme, 1987). Even more striking is the absence of studies that focus on opposition in EU politics; contributions by Neunreither (1998), Mair (2007Mair ( , 2013 and Helms (2009) are rare exceptions.…”

“…The notion that opposition is in decline has been with us ever since the classical contributions by Kirchheimer () and Dahl (), and it has continuously been highlighted as a key trend by scholars examining contemporary governance in Europe (Katz and Mair, ; Kitschelt, ). From this idea of a waning of opposition (see Loxbo and Sjölin, ) we may derive the following proposition:Hypothesis Opposition in EU politics has been declining over time .…”