Voters’ commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs

Hollanders, David; Vis, Barbara

doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9872-1

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…Another body of empirical work suggests that manipulating perceptions to avoid blame will be easier when the socioeconomic situation is deteriorating (Kuipers 2006;Vis 2010;Hollanders and Vis 2013;van Kersbergen and Vis 2014). Political actors then may convince voters more easily that something needs to be done to turn the tide, like retrenchment (cf.…”

Section: Manipulation Perceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

Vis

2015

Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice

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This article takes stock of and reviews the comparative literature on blame avoidance strategies in social policy reform to identify the conditions under which blame avoidance strategies are necessary (or not). This helps to solve the seemingly contradictory findings that blame avoidance strategies may not (always) be necessary while they are often employed. Moreover, it proposes that experimental designs help to establish the effect of blame avoidance strategies and presents an approach for assessing systematically the employment and success of blame avoidance strategies. Hereby, the article outlines a research agenda for comparative theory development.

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Section: Manipulation Perceptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

Vis

2015

Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice

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“…Lastly, socioeconomic pressures, especially financial and economic crises, form another contextual factor which should determine the composition of policy communication in a specific way: economic crises do not only offer a window of opportunity for policy change and for pushing through unpopular reforms (Fernandez, 2012; Hollanders and Vis, 2013; Vis, 2009). Similarly, with regard to the communication of these reforms, crises represent remarkable resources to be employed in their presentation and justification as well.…”

Section: Hypotheses On the Effects Of Contextual Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communicating austerity measures during times of crisis: A comparative empirical analysis of four heads of government

König

2016

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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This article develops a coherent framework for analyzing policy communication; Conceptualizes how policy communication can be understood as a function of contextual factors; Empirically maps the policy communication of four political leaders. Points to the importance of political competition and welfare culture for systematic variation in policy communication. To what extent are political leaders’ policy communications shaped by the context in which they act? This article addresses this so far largely disregarded question by means of a systematic comparison of broader communication profiles. Based on a content analysis, it empirically maps how Mario Monti, Mariano Rajoy, Enda Kenny and David Cameron communicated austerity policies, which meant considerable cuts in the welfare state, during the European debt crisis. The findings suggest that a lower degree of political competition manifests in political leaders’ communication in terms of a more consensual stance. The evidence is also partly in line with the assumption that liberal welfare culture allows for a policy communication that is more strongly based on norm- and value-based justifications. Surprisingly, the expectation that the crisis condition led to a stronger emphasis on the costs/risks of the status quo is not borne out in the data.

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“…Nobody likes to be cheated, and if the public considers the government to be deceitful because it attempts to hide the true consequences of its policies, punishment might be severe (Fehr & Gächter 2000).This was allegedly what happened to the Danish Social Democratic government in 1998 when it embarked on the retrenchment of early retirement benefits (Andersen 1999, 266-9;2011, 14-16). In this line of argument, only governments with little to lose pursue unpopular reforms (Hollanders & Vis 2012;Vis & van Kersbergen 2007) -a situation we discuss in more detail below.…”

Section: The Classical Strategy: Avoid the Blame!mentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Re‐framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote‐seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms

Elmelund‐Præstekær

Emmenegger

2013

Scand Pol Stud

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Most political science accounts assume that governments in Western democracies avoid unpopular reforms to protect their re‐election chances. Nevertheless, governments sometimes embark on electorally risky reforms – even in times when they have no slack in the polls. In this article, it is argued that pursuing unpopular reforms can be a perfectly rational strategy for vote‐seeking governments. Based on a simple game theoretical model that compares strategic framing with the classic blame avoidance strategy, it is demonstrated that unpopular policy reforms allow governments to pursue gains of both policy and votes by opting for a highly visible strategy of reframing the substantive reform issue in question. This general argument is illustrated with the substantial 2011 retrenchment of Danish early retirement benefits. This particular welfare state programme was highly popular. Nevertheless, the incumbent Liberal prime minister proposed to abolish it only a few months prior to a national election while his government was trailing significantly in the polls.

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Voters’ commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs

Cited by 7 publications

References 60 publications

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

Taking Stock of the Comparative Literature on the Role of Blame Avoidance Strategies in Social Policy Reform

Communicating austerity measures during times of crisis: A comparative empirical analysis of four heads of government

Strategic Re‐framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote‐seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms

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