Voter turnout and the size of government

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper investigates the causal link between voter turnout and policy outcomes related to the size of government. Tax rate and public expenditures are the focal policy outcomes in this study. To capture the causal mechanism, Swedish and Finnish municipal data are used and a constitutional change in Sweden in 1970 is applied as an instrument for voter turnout in local elections. In 1970, Sweden moved from having separate election days for different levels of government, among other things, to a system with a single election day for political elections, thus reducing the cost associated with voting. This constitutional reform increased voter turnout in local elections in Sweden. The overall conclusion of this paper is that higher voter turnout yields higher municipal taxes and larger local public expenditures. Second, there is some evidence that higher turnout decreases the vote share for right-wing parties. Terms of use: Documents in

Selective Abstention in Simultaneous Elections: Understanding the Turnout Gap

“…For example, in the most recent election in 2018, the turnout difference in the national and the municipal election varied between 0.7% in the municipality of Bjurholm and as much as 11.9% in the municipality of Eda (Statistics Sweden 2020). The systematic differences in the turnout base that we document may thus have meaningful consequences for public policies (Aggeborn 2016;Fowler 2013;Fujiwara 2015;Hansford and Gomez 2010). Furthermore, elections between parties and candidates are often decided by small margins.…”

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