Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies

Crisp, Brian F.; Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C.; Jones, Bradford S.; Jones, Mark P.; Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00278.x

Cited by 210 publications

(205 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Party affiliations, interest groups, personal linkages and heterogeneity play a role apart from the electoral system. Crisp et al (2004) argue empirically with data of bill initiation activity in six presidential democracies that with centralized candidate selection and as district magnitude increases, members of parliament will less frequently initiate legislation aimed at a particular constituency and rather focus on the national party's interest. By analyzing voting results of two different amendments enacted by the Swiss parliament and surveys conducted amongst the legislators, Bailer et al (2008) find that deputies elected under proportional representation, i.e., from districts with a larger number of seats, act closer in accordance with their parties than deputies from small plurality or close to plurality districts.…”

Section: Literature Overviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

2011

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Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012Voter preferences, Political economy, Electoral systems, D72, D70, H00,

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Section: Literature Overviewmentioning

confidence: 98%

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

2011

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“…Broadly speaking, there are two types of benefits that voters desire from their representatives: particularistic goods and programmatic goods (Crisp et al, 2004;S. W. Desposato, 2006).…”

Section: Voter Demands Access To Resources and Party Switchingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voter Demands, Access to Resources, and Party Switching: Evidence from the South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2008

Shin¹

2013

Japanese Journal of Political Science

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This paper investigates why some legislators tend to switch parties frequentlywhich is believed to undermine effective representation of citizen interests in democracies -while others tend to stay put. On the assumption that the ultimate goal of legislators is to be reelected, I argue that voters' demands for local/individual benefits, or pork, and legislators' lack of access to resources for such benefits are likely to lead the legislators to switch parties in order to improve their electoral chances in the subsequent election. By analyzing party switches by legislators from 1988 to 2008 in South Korea, where the president controls access to the pork pipeline, I find that the president's party members are less likely and independents are more likely to change party affiliations, irrespective of voter demands for pork or national public policies. However, I also find that opposition party legislators who are elected from less-developed districts, where voters tend to desire pork over policy, are more likely to switch parties than those elected from more-developed districts. These findings suggest that interaction between voter demands and party access to resources influences politicians' party loyalty: voter demands for pork (or policy) tend to lead politicians to be less (or more) loyal to their current parties. Voter demands, however, have little impact on the party loyalty of those who are already in parties with access to the pork pipeline.

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“…O resultado concreto pretende promover estabilidade de governo por meio da continuidade que vai além de indivíduos e determinar seqüências de responsabilização por atos governamentais. Boa parte da avaliação dos partidos como mecanismos de representação analisa as conseqüências de variação dessas normas (Carey, 2003;Crisp et al, 2004;Mainwaring;Scully, 1995). Ao longo do tempo e do espaço, tem variado bastante a capacidade de os partidos latino-americanos assegurarem tais funções governamentais (Mainwaring, 1999a(Mainwaring, , 2006.…”

Section: Representação Por Meio De Governo E Espaço Públicounclassified

Representação, partidos e sociedade civil na Argentina e no Brasil

Hochstetler¹,

Friedman

2008

Cad. CRH

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DOSSIÊ REPRESENTAÇÃO POR ORGANIZAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NO BRASIL E NA ARGENTINAQuão bem as organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) representam os cidadãos? No contexto da crise dos partidos políticos na América Latina e em boa parte do mundo democrático, essa pergunta tem se tornado particularmente relevante. Este artigo indaga se organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) podem desempenhar, e se de fato desempenham, a função essencial de representação nesses tempos de crise partidária. Em especial, investigamos a seguinte hipótese de crise de representação: de que "cidadãos, em todo o mundo, trocaram formas mais antigas e tradicionais de representação, como partidos políticos e sindicatos, por 'novos' modelos, como movimentos sociais, grupos informais de cidadãos e organizações não governamentais (ONGs)" (Chandoke, 2005, p.308;Bartolini;Mair 2001;Lawson;Merkl, 1988;Lawson; Poguntke, 2004;Pearce, 2004). Para tanto, examinamos práticas recentes de representação no Brasil e na Argentina, dois países em que os partidos políticos têm passado por fortes crises, após décadas de reações mistas aos seus sistemas partidários. Em momentos como esses, a substituição de partidos por OSCs deveria ser muito evidente. Como demonstramos a seguir, a crise partidária argentina era consideravelmente mais profunda que a brasileira; pela hipótese de crise de representação, portanto, deveria haver mais provas de uma troca por formas não-partidárias de representação na Argentina.Começamos por um exame teórico a respeito de como as OSCs podem desempenhar a função de representação, usando o modelo de representação partidária como guia. Sobre a relação entre representação partidária e de OSCs, perguntamos: é complementar ou concorrente? Nas próxi-mas seções empíricas, caracterizamos a natureza das recentes crises partidárias nesses dois países,

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Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies

Cited by 210 publications

References 31 publications

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Voter Demands, Access to Resources, and Party Switching: Evidence from the South Korean National Assembly, 1988–2008

Representação, partidos e sociedade civil na Argentina e no Brasil

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