Voluntaristic Action as a Distinct Concept: Theoretical Foundations of Societal Constitutionalism

Sciulli, David

doi:10.2307/2095365

Cited by 36 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…To begin with, Parsons often buried insights into comparative research under conceptual distinctions that clearly remain important but that were so hopelessly mislabeled by Parsons that they misled both proponents (like Eisenstadt, and also Neil Smelser, Robert Bellah, and Bernard Barber) and critics (like Blumer, and even Robert Merton and Lewis Coser, to say nothing of Alvin Gouldner). In jettisoning many of these labels and reformulating functionalist concepts, I found, for instance (Sciulli 1986), and quite in retrospect, that in effect there was no alternative other than to recapitulate the fundamental corrective to the excesses of functionalism that clearly can be traced to Blumer's symbolic interactionism.…”

Section: Blumer and Parsonsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Reconsidering Blumer's Corrective Against the Excesses of Functionalism

Sciulli

1988

Symbolic Interaction

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Blumer's corrective to Parsons' excesses is presented against a backdrop provided by two reformulations of Parsons' concepts: The problems of social order is recast as the problem of nonauthoritarian social order, and voluntaristic action is distinguished from normative action. Blumer's corrective, then, was to see that distinctively voluntaristic action is ineluctably the product of actors' negotiations of meaning (whereas both purposive‐rational and non‐rational action can more legitimately be abstracted from this process and treated as more reified by social analyses). Parsons' optimism about social order was unwarranted, as was Blumer's complacency about the problem of arbitrary power. It is suggested in conclusion that Parsons' theory ironically evinces more respect for the individual's integrity than does Blumer's.

show abstract

Section: Blumer and Parsonsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Reconsidering Blumer's Corrective Against the Excesses of Functionalism

Sciulli

1988

Symbolic Interaction

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…He did so in order to emphasize, first, that these norms are neither strictly formally-rational (bureaucratic) nor entirely non-rational (religious) and, second, that they are worldly (Sciulli 1986;1992: Chap. 7).…”

Section: Why Profession Is a Problematic Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, this accounts for today's steady return of Parsonian issues or concerns to continental discussions of "experts" and "professions" as they understand it (see Sciulli and Halley 2009 for elaboration). 6) For other departures from Parsons, see Sciulli 2006Sciulli , 1992 in origin, as Parsons proposed and as Bürgertum approaches still consider. It also is certainly not narrowly socio-economic, as Anglo-American received wisdom either asserts or presupposes.…”

Section: The Alternative Proposed Herementioning

confidence: 99%

Why Professions Matter: Structural Invariance, Institutional Consequences, Bias

Sciulli

2010

Comp Sociol

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AppendixReceived wisdom in the sociology of professions employs two approaches, a narrow socio-economic approach (largely in the Anglo-American world) and a much broader cultural and social-psychological approach (largely on the Continent). Both approaches agree on two points. First, professions cannot be distinguished at a conceptual level from other occupations. Second, whatever consequences either successful or failed professionalism introduces into civil society or state administration are confined to the occupational order and stratification system. They do not and cannot affect the direction of social change. The alternative approach outlined and discussed here is structural and institutional. With this approach we distinguish professions proper analytically from other occupations and we identify consequences of professionalism proper that uniquely reflect or anticipate notable shifts in the direction of social change.One consensus in the sociology of professions today is that professions are simply a type of status category in the occupational order and stratification system. They are no more significant than thousands of other occupations, which also confer statuses. Professions are not more distinctive socio-economically, nor culturally and social-psychologically -to say nothing of structurally and institutionally. Certainly, they are hardly capable of contributing (somehow) to "social order," let alone of doing so uniquely among

show abstract

“…As is well known, in the BAS decisions must be made universalistically, impartially, and impersonallythey must not incorporate the interests of officials. Under collegiality, while there is a similar set of abstract procedural norms (Sciulli 1986) such norms are established to protect the rights of colleagues to autonomous action and not merely the rights of vulnerable clients to equality of treatment. So the procedural norms of collegiality frequently represent a reconciliation of the interests of professionals with the interests of clients.…”

Section: Normative Arrangementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alternative Organizational Formations: A Neoweberian Typology of Polycratic Administrative Systems

Waters

1993

The Sociological Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Much of the critical attention given to Weber's tripartite scheme of legitimate domination has focused on the issue of its supposed incapacity to accommodate forms of organization not based on instrumental rationality. In fact substantive rationality is a continuous point of reference in Weber's analysis and surfaces in his brief and fragmentary outlines of three polycratic organizational forms: collegiality, mass democracy, and direct democracy. This article locates polycratic organizations in relation to the three monocratic structures indicated by the typology of legitimate domination. Extant examples of polycratic organizations are compared substantively. The three forms are then typologized in terms first of characteristics of participation by personnel, and second of the processes by which decisions are made.

show abstract

Voluntaristic Action as a Distinct Concept: Theoretical Foundations of Societal Constitutionalism

Cited by 36 publications

References 33 publications

Reconsidering Blumer's Corrective Against the Excesses of Functionalism

Reconsidering Blumer's Corrective Against the Excesses of Functionalism

Why Professions Matter: Structural Invariance, Institutional Consequences, Bias

Alternative Organizational Formations: A Neoweberian Typology of Polycratic Administrative Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About