Virtue, Vice, and Situationism

Abstract

Forthcoming in:Oxford Handbook of Virtue, ed. Nancy Snow, Oxford: Oxford University Press. AbstractOn the basis of psychological research, a group of philosophers known as 'situationists' argue that the evidence belies the existence of broad and stable (or 'global') character traits. They argue that this condemns as psychologically unrealistic those traditions in moral theory in which global virtues are upheld as ideals. After a survey of the debate to date, this article argues that the thesis of situationism is ill-supported by the available evidence. Situationists overlook the explanatory potential of a large class of global character traits, namely, vices that do not involve other-directed malevolence, such as laziness, cowardice, and selfishness. A detailed discussion of the relevant empirical studies bearing on moral psychology shows that the behavioral patterns observed in these studies are consistent with the widespread possession of such non-malicious vices. This means, contrary to the situationist thesis, that the empirical record is fully compatible with the common existence of global character traits.

Virtue vs. virtue ethics

“…(Doris 2002, p. 22) Empirical research however, as so-called situationists claim, 5 has shown that the first of those structural features, the cross-situational consistency of character traits, is not even a remote option when it comes to the basic psychological make-up 5 For an overview of the various strands of situationism and a critical assessment see Sabini & Silver (2005); Halbig (2013), pp. 108-141; Bates & Kleingeld (2018). 6 The second feature is rather uncontroversial in both ancient and contemporary debates although it is obviously in need of being spelled out with regard to the notions of reliability and similarity it implies.…”

Group Character

“…Others have challenged the validity of particular situationist experiments, some of whichsuch as the famous Zimbardo (1973) prison experimenthave recently become embroiled in 46 Bates et al (2018) charge that situationists work with an overly narrow conception of vice, arguing that situationist results are consistent with the common existence of "vices that do not involve otherdirected malevolence" (p. 524). 47 Moreover, as e.g.…”