Virtue and Right

Johnson, Robert N.

doi:10.1086/373952

Cited by 107 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…One objection to virtue ethics has been that, if you do something for the sake of moral self-improvement, this somehow counts for less (Johnson 2003). This is a fair objection; virtue ethics does value behavior differently depending on the type of motivation involved.…”

Section: Final Endsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue and Behavior

Baker

2009

Review of Social Economy

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This paper supports Amartya Sen's contention that our moral behavior cannot be represented in economic modeling, given the assumptions accepted by most rational choice theorists. In this paper Sen's argument is supplemented by traditional virtue ethics, which can account for how and why “commitment” is counter-preferential. Yet the changes to economic methodology that Sen recommends are rendered unnecessary by a particular innovation in Stoic ethical theory. If the Stoic distinction between indifferent goods and moral goods is invoked, economics can proceed apace, under the assumption that it is the science that handles our behavior in regard to indifferents only.stoicism, ethics, value, virtue, rational choice,

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Section: Final Endsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue and Behavior

Baker

2009

Review of Social Economy

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“…For contemporary defenders of the doctrine of the mean, see Curzer (1996), Kurschwitz (1986), and Martin (1994). 19 See Johnson (2003). 20 Aristotle might have allowed for a solution along these lines.…”

Section: Virtue Theories and The Supererogatorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory

Kawall

2008

Philos Stud

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I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.Discussion of the supererogatory in the last half-century has been sparked in large part by J. O. Urmson's 1958 article, ''Saints and Heroes''. 1 Urmson argues that there is a class of actions-the supererogatory-that cannot be adequately accounted for by traditional divisions of actions into the obligatory, the forbidden, and the permissible. He has us consider the actions of a doctor who chooses to travel to a plague-ridden city in order to help combat the crisis, and ease the suffering of those trapped there. It seems too much to demand that all people (or even all doctors) perform such actions-we would not blame other doctors who do not make such extreme sacrifices, and do not take such extreme risks to their own well-being. The

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“…46-50. ) 11 This objection stems from Johnson (2003). aspiration to improve in order to reach new and higher levels.…”

Section: Driver's Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue Ethics and Elitism

Svensson

2008

Philosophical Papers

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Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the basic normative requirement of virtue ethics.

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Virtue and Right

Cited by 107 publications

References 10 publications

Virtue and Behavior

Virtue and Behavior

Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory

Virtue Ethics and Elitism

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