Virtue theory, ideal observers, and the supererogatory

Abstract

I argue that recent virtue theories (including those of Hursthouse, Slote, and Swanton) face important initial difficulties in accommodating the supererogatory. In particular, I consider several potential characterizations of the supererogatory modeled upon these familiar virtue theories (and their accounts of rightness) and argue that they fail to provide an adequate account of supererogation. In the second half of the paper I sketch an alternative virtue-based characterization of supererogation, one that is grounded in the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers, and that avoids the concerns raised in the first part of the paper.Discussion of the supererogatory in the last half-century has been sparked in large part by J. O. Urmson's 1958 article, ''Saints and Heroes''. 1 Urmson argues that there is a class of actions-the supererogatory-that cannot be adequately accounted for by traditional divisions of actions into the obligatory, the forbidden, and the permissible. He has us consider the actions of a doctor who chooses to travel to a plague-ridden city in order to help combat the crisis, and ease the suffering of those trapped there. It seems too much to demand that all people (or even all doctors) perform such actions-we would not blame other doctors who do not make such extreme sacrifices, and do not take such extreme risks to their own well-being. The

Must we be perfect?: A case against supererogation

“…These arguments from some of the major normative ethics systems are not intended to be conclusive. There are, of course, several deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theoretical arguments that purport to make room for supererogatory acts (respectively, Brinkmann 2015, Hooker 2002, Kawall 2009. The point of this overview was just to show that, on the face of things, none of the three major normative theories seem to have a natural place for them.…”

The Suberogation Problem for Lei Zhong's Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation

“…(VO) It is morally obligatory for an agent A to φ in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous and relevantly informed person V would characteristically φ in C. (Zhong, 2016, 329) However, this account faces the so-called supererogation problem (Kawall, 2009). A supererogatory action is an action that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory.…”

A Dilemma for Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

“…Rival virtue ethical accounts of supererogation have been proposed elsewhere. 25 Alternatively, we might (ii) reject the neo-Aristotelian account, and then deny that an account of supererogation is even necessary.…”