Viral Infections Contracted in the Laboratory

Sulkin, S. Edward; Pike, Robert M.

doi:10.1056/nejm194908042410505

Cited by 56 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 96 publications

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“…Other studies have shown that BSL-3 facilities use more hands-on training BSL-3 LABORATORY PRACTICES compared to BSL-2 facilities. 17 Similar to our findings, lecture-based training was more common than hands-on training. 17 In order to maximize retention, the type of training offered (hands-on versus lecture-based) should be customized based on the activity; 17 it may be sufficient to use lecture-based in some training, but more useful to use hands-on in other training.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

“…A comprehensive survey of published laboratory-acquired infections reported that investigators were likely unwilling to report laboratory-acquired infections because of embarrassment or fear of dismissal. 16,17 The first published report regarding incidence of laboratory-acquired infections was based on mail surveys and published literature. 18 A later study examined laboratory-acquired infections using mail surveys, published literature, and personal communication and noted that 64% of laboratory-acquired infections had been officially reported.…”

Section: Laboratory-acquired Infectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities

Richards¹,

Pompei²,

Anderson³

2014

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, an

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New construction of biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories in the United States has increased in the past decade to facilitate research on potential bioterrorism agents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention inspect BSL-3 facilities and review commissioning documentation, but no single agency has oversight over all BSL-3 facilities. This article explores the extent to which standard operating procedures in US BSL-3 facilities vary between laboratories with select agent or non-select agent status. Comparisons are made for the following variables: personnel training, decontamination, personal protective equipment (PPE), medical surveillance, security access, laboratory structure and maintenance, funding, and pest management. Facilities working with select agents had more complex training programs and decontamination procedures than non-select agent facilities. Personnel working in select agent laboratories were likely to use powered air purifying respirators, while non-select agent laboratories primarily used N95 respirators. More rigorous medical surveillance was carried out in select agent workers (although not required by the select agent program) and a higher level of restrictive access to laboratories was found. Most select agent and non-select agent laboratories reported adequate structural integrity in facilities; however, differences were observed in personnel perception of funding for repairs. Pest management was carried out by select agent personnel more frequently than non-select agent personnel. Our findings support the need to promote high quality biosafety training and standard operating procedures in both select agent and non-select agent laboratories to improve occupational health and safety.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Laboratory-acquired Infectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities

Richards¹,

Pompei²,

Anderson³

2014

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, an

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“…In 1949, Nauck and Weyer (148) described 13 laboratory-acquired infections with Q fever, and when the rickettsial organism was transferred to a neighboring laboratory, 20 additional laboratoryacquired infections occurred. In 1949, Sulkin and Pike (199) published their first survey of 227 laboratory-acquired viral infections. Only 27 of these infections were the result of known accidents, the most common of which was splashing infectious material in the face or eyes.…”

Section: Laboratory-acquired Infections Historical Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Biological safety cabinetry

Kruse¹,

Puckett²,

Richardson³

1991

Clin Microbiol Rev

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The biological safety cabinet is the one piece of laboratory and pharmacy equipment that provides protection for personnel, the product, and the environment. Through the history of laboratory-acquired infections from the earliest published case to the emergence of hepatitis B and AIDS, the need for health care worker protection is described. A brief description with design, construction, function, and production capabilities is provided for class I and class III safety cabinets. The development of the high-efficiency particulate air filter provided the impetus for clean room technology, from which evolved the class II laminar flow biological safety cabinet. The clean room concept was advanced when the horizontal airflow clean bench was manufactured; it became popular in pharmacies for preparing intravenous solutions because the product was protected. However, as with infectious microorganisms and laboratory workers, individual sensitization to antibiotics and the advent of hazardous antineoplastic agents changed the thinking of pharmacists and nurses, and they began to use the class II safety cabinet to prevent adverse personnel reactions to the drugs. How the class II safety cabinet became the mainstay in laboratories and pharmacies is described, and insight is provided into the formulation of National Sanitation Foundation standard number 49 and its revisions. The working operations of a class II cabinet are described, as are the variations of the four types with regard to design, function, air velocity profiles, and the use of toxins. The main certification procedures are explained, with examples of improper or incorrect certifications. The required levels of containment for microorganisms are given. Instructions for decontaminating the class II biological safety cabinet of infectious agents are provided; unfortunately, there is no method for decontaminating the cabinet of antineoplastic agents.

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“…Workplace-acquired infections have been reported in the literature since the early 1900s (CDC, 1999;Collins & Kennedy, 1999;Collins, 2000;Sewell 1995;Sulkin & Pike 1949, 1951. These reports suggested that the prevalence of potential exposure combined with the route of possible transmission were key risk factors in possible contraction of disease.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using the Results of Routine Laboratory Workplace Surveillance Activities to Assess Compliance with Recommended Biosafety Guidelines

Zerwekh

Emery²,

Waring³

et al. 2004

Appl Biosaf.

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Safety associated with the handling of potentially infectious agents has historically been achieved through adherence to recommended safety practices rather than through strict compliance with codified regulations. In the absence of a codified regulatory structure, there is also an absence of compliance inspections, so an objective assessment of the level of conformity with recommended biosafety practices is not generally available. In this study, the outcomes of 768 biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) safety surveys were analyzed for commonalities and trends. The data from a subset of 190 BSL-2 laboratories, which were subjected to sequential safety surveys, were examined for temporal changes and trends in compliance levels. The most frequent items of noncompliance encountered during the study time frame were the failure to recertify biosafety cabinetry, followed by ventilation not being negative to the hallway, disorderly general housekeeping, and lack of appropriate hazard communication labeling and postings. Not surprising, the bulk of noncompliance issues encountered were practice-related. Of greater interest was the finding that the five most frequently cited issues represented 68% of the total number of instances of noncompliance recorded during the study period. The findings described in this study are significant because, for the first time, the outcomes of compliance with recommended biosafety practices are characterized and can be used as the basis for focused interventions. Since biosafety is heavily reliant on adherence to specific safety practices, the ability to focus interventions on objectively identified practice-related items of noncompliance can assist in the reduction of worker risk in a field likely to experience tremendous growth in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.

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Viral Infections Contracted in the Laboratory

Cited by 56 publications

References 96 publications

BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities

BSL-3 Laboratory Practices in the United States: Comparison of Select Agent and Non–Select Agent Facilities

Biological safety cabinetry

Using the Results of Routine Laboratory Workplace Surveillance Activities to Assess Compliance with Recommended Biosafety Guidelines

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