Pubic lice (Pthirus pubis) maintain a worldwide parasitic population infesting two to over 10 percent of human populations, continuing a presence that has been constant since early evidence 10,000 years ago. Outbreaks in the 1970s have been recorded, but incomplete records preclude description of a definitive population cycle. Current levels of infestation in a US college student population were investigated in this study. Knowledge and opinions of students were also recorded in an online survey administered to college students taking a basic health course at a mid-sized East Coast University. In a group of 817 students, 35 reported experience with pubic lice or other STD infection. Knowledge, beliefs, and treatment attitudes were examined for the 782 students who did not have experience with either pubic lice or STD infection. These students deemed antibiotics as a viable treatment for pubic lice infestation. They also indicated negative attitudes toward the use of pesticide crèmes, which are the most useful prescription. Symptoms and transmission myths in student answers are described.

Natural disasters such as hurricanes may contribute to mosquito abundance and, consequently, arbovirus transmission risk. In 2011, flooding from Hurricane Irene in eastern North Carolina (NC) resulted in increased mosquito populations that hindered recovery efforts. Budget shortfalls in NC have reduced the functionality of long-term mosquito surveillance and control programs; hence, many counties rely on the Federal Emergency Management Agency for post-disaster mosquito control. This pilot study examines mosquito abundance pre- and post-aerial insecticide spraying at eight study sites in Washington and Tyrrell Counties in rural eastern NC after Hurricane Irene. Percent change was calculated and compared for traps in areas that received aerial pesticide application and those that did not. Traps in spray zones show decreases in mosquito abundance when compared to control traps (treatment: −52.93%; control: 3.55%), although no significant differences (P = 0.286) were found in mosquito abundance between groups. Implications of reactive rather than proactive mosquito control responses are discussed.

New construction of biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories in the United States has increased in the past decade to facilitate research on potential bioterrorism agents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention inspect BSL-3 facilities and review commissioning documentation, but no single agency has oversight over all BSL-3 facilities. This article explores the extent to which standard operating procedures in US BSL-3 facilities vary between laboratories with select agent or non-select agent status. Comparisons are made for the following variables: personnel training, decontamination, personal protective equipment (PPE), medical surveillance, security access, laboratory structure and maintenance, funding, and pest management. Facilities working with select agents had more complex training programs and decontamination procedures than non-select agent facilities. Personnel working in select agent laboratories were likely to use powered air purifying respirators, while non-select agent laboratories primarily used N95 respirators. More rigorous medical surveillance was carried out in select agent workers (although not required by the select agent program) and a higher level of restrictive access to laboratories was found. Most select agent and non-select agent laboratories reported adequate structural integrity in facilities; however, differences were observed in personnel perception of funding for repairs. Pest management was carried out by select agent personnel more frequently than non-select agent personnel. Our findings support the need to promote high quality biosafety training and standard operating procedures in both select agent and non-select agent laboratories to improve occupational health and safety.

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